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I. INTRODUCTION
Workers compensation law is a statutory replacement for tort remedies
between employer and employee.' In exchange for the protection of an
exclusive remedy,2 employers agree to provide benefits to workers injured
during the course and scope of their employment . State statute determines
whether an employer's liability must be covered by insurance, who is
covered under the definition of employee, the benefits to be awarded, the
mechanism for administrative review, and other elements necessary to the
implementation of the workers compensation system.4 When an employer's
liability under workers compensation law may or must be covered by insur-
ance,5 the insurance contract must be filed with and approved by the State.6
At present, forty-two states and the District of Columbia utilize a standard
Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance Policy ("WC-
ELIP").'
I. ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, §§ 1.00-1.20 (1993).
2. See Cartier v. Florida Power & Light Co., 594 So. 2d 755, 756 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App.), reviewdenied, 602 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1992). In Cartier, the court held that a provision
of workers compensation insurance, in this case self-insurance on behalf of an independent
contractor, provided the employer with the exclusive remedy of workers compensation law
and precluded a tort action against the employer by the injured employee. See id
3. See id
4. In Florida, workers compensation law is governed by chapter 440 of the Florida
Statutes.
5. FLA. STAT. § 440.10 (1991).
6. Id. § 627.410. In most states, filing of workers compensation policy forms and
endorsements is made by a rating or advisory organization on behalf of its members and
subscribers. The National Council on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") acts as such an
organization in thirty-one states and the District of Columbia. Thirteen states have
independent rating bureaus which make filings on behalf of their members and subscribers,
and six states plus Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands provide workers
compensation insurance through monopolistic funds.
7. In its capacity as a licensed rating or advisory organization, NCCI filed a revised
WCELIP to become effective April 1, 1992. Florida, and 29 other states in which NCCI files
policy forms on behalf of its members and subscribers, approved the revised WCELIP. As
of this writing, only one state in which NCCI is the rating or advisory organization has not
approved the 1992 policy revision.
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Florida law provides that jurisdiction for appeals of decisions of the
Judges of Compensation Claims is vested in the First District Court of
Appeal.! This paper will examine the workers compensation decisions of
the First District Court of Appeal issued between January 1992 and October
1993 within the framework of the WCELIP.
The standard WCELIP contains a General Section followed by six
parts:9 Part One (Workers Compensation Insurance) provides statutory
Workers Compensation Coverage; Part Two (Employers Liability Insurance)
provides coverage to employers which is not governed by statute; Part Three
(Other States Insurance) provides the ability to elect coverage in states in
which the employer may have temporary and incidental exposure; Part Four
(Your Duties If Injury Occurs) outlines the insured's duties in the event of
injury; Part Five (Premium) contains the premium provisions; and Part Six
(Conditions) contains the policy conditions not shown elsewhere in the
policy.'0 Also included as part of the policy are the Information Page and
endorsements selected by the insured to exclude or provide specialized
coverages. "
II. GENERAL SECTION
A. The Policy (General Section A)
This policy includes at its effective date the Information Page and all
endorsements and schedules listed there. It is a contract of insurance
between you (the employer named in Item 1 of the Information Page)
and us (the insurer named on the Information Page). The only agree-
ments relating to this insurance are stated in this policy. The terms of
this policy may not be changed or waived except by endorsement issued
by us to be part of this policy. 2
8. FLA. STAT. § 440.271 (1991).
9. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE, THE GUIDE TO THE
WORKERS COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYERS LIABILITY POLICY (1992) [hereinafter GUIDE];
see also FLA. STAT. § 627.413 (1991).
10. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 5-23.
11. Id. at 24. The WCELIP is a contract for the provision of insurance. The
endorsements attached to the policy serve as addenda which modify the basic insuring
contract.
12. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE, WORKERS COMPENSATION
AND EMPLOYERS LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY-WC 00 00 00 (effective April 1, 1984)
[hereinafter POLICY]. The revised WCELIP-WC 00 00 00 A became effective April 1, 1992
and is not the insuring contract for the cases interpreted by the First District Court of Appeal
[Vol. 18
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The Information Page of a WCELIP contains the data that determines
who is insured, 3 for what liability, in what states, and for what premium.
General Section A serves to incorporate the data on the Information Page
into the WCELIP. Material misrepresentation of data regarding workers
compensation applications, claims, and premium calculation is grounds in
some jurisdictions for recision of the policy' and/or for civil or criminal
liability. 5 Almost every jurisdiction allows for recalculation of the
premium to meet the actual employer data that should have been report-
ed.' 6  While litigation frequently occurs over the calculation of the
premium and the conditions of coverage, this paper deals with issues
between the employer/carrier and the employee, and generally refrains from
discussing issues between the employer and the carrier under state insurance
laws.
during the time period covered by this paper.
13. The WCELIP names the insured as the business entity insuring its employees.
GUIDE, supra note 9, at 2. Individual officers of the company are not covered when acting
in their personal capacity. Id. In Florida, however, a civil suit may be filed against
corporate officers upon a showing of gross negligence. FLA. STAT. § 440.10(1) (1991). If
found guilty of gross negligence, the WCELIP does not provide coverage or a defense for
these officers. In Langton v. De Cenzo, 592 So. 2d 318,,319 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991),
the court determined that the claimant's estate had not established that the corporate officers
were guilty of gross negligence, and thus limited the claimant's estate to a workers
compensation remedy.
14. Recision is an extreme penalty that renders the policy voidable. See N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 59A-18-11 (Michie 1993),
15. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11760, 11880 (Deering 1993) (civil penalty of not less
than $2,000 and not more than $5,000, plus an assessment of not more than three times the
amount of the medical treatment expenses paid for the willful misrepresentation of facts in
order to obtain compensation insurance, and for knowingly making false or fraudulent oral
or written statements in support of a claim for compensation); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-290c
(1992) (establishes penalties for the fraudulent claim or receipt of benefits); FLA. STAT. §
440.37 (Supp. 1992) (provides penalties for fraudulent activities and misrepresentation); 1993
LA. ACTS 828 (stipulates that the willful misrepresentation by an employer to an employee
regarding compensation insurance shall be punishable by imprisonment of no less than one
year and not more than 10, or a fine of not more than $10,000 or both); MD. CODE ANN.
§ 10-141 (1993) (stipulates that a person, who knowingly received benefits not entitled to
them, repay the full amount plus interest at a rate of 1.5 percent per month from the date the
commission notifies the individual); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.758 (1991) (provides civil
penalties for misrepresentation, and failure or refusal to keep employment data).
16. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-45-114 (Supp. 1993), which allows recalculation
of premium for misrepresentation. Most other jurisdictions allow recalculation of the
premium in even years after the policy effective period. This is accomplished by means of
a policy provision which permits the final premium to be determined by an audit after the
expiration of the WCELIP. See discussion infra at note 463 and accompanying text.
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The Information Page identifies the employer during a policy term, and
thus determines which employer is responsible for payment of claims found
to be compensable under the policy. In Devilling v. Rimes, Inc.,' 7 the
plaintiff appealed a decision of the Judge of Compensation Claims ("JCC"),
which held that injuries suffered by the claimant, though compensable, had
occurred while the plaintiff was in the employ of a business other than
Rimes, Inc.'8 The JCC held that Rimes, Inc. and its insurance carrier were
not liable for treatment of the original job-related injury." The claimant's
injury did not occur within the course and scope of employment with Rimes,
Inc. and the court determined that the request for benefits from Rimes, Inc.
was a means by which the claimant could avoid the two-year statute of
limitations for making a claim under the workers compensation statute of
Florida.2° The court examined the medical care provided to the claimant
and held that not all medically recommended care is the type of treatment
that would extend the statute of limitations.2'
The Information Page also determines the policy period for which the
insurer is responsible. In Marriott Hotel v. Restrepo,22 the court examined
carrier responsibility for a compensable injury and determined that further
findings of fact were necessary to determine whether the claimant had
reached maximum medical improvement ("MMI") following the third
incident in a series of three separate industrial accidents.23 Only after the
determination of MMI was made for the third accident, would the JCC be
able to decide the benefits to be paid by the carrier of record as of the date
of each accident.24
By defining the insured, the insurer and the policy period to be
covered, the Information Page serves to clarify the party responsible for the
payments to injured workers. In Entenmann's Bakery v. Nunez,2 5 the court
examined which WCELIP was required to respond to an injured claimant.
The appellants in Nunez were the insurance carriers who provided coverage
for Entenmann's Bakery during different policy periods. 26 The court's
17. 591 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
18. Id. at 305.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 603 So. 2d 674, 676 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
23. Maximum medical improvement is the threshold that must be reached to determine
the degree of compensation due an employee. Id.
24. Id.
25. 592 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
26. See id.
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determination was based upon consideration of the policy period in relation
to the type and timing of compensable injuries sustained by the claimant.27
Nunez demonstrates the underlying concern for the needs of the injured
worker by providing benefits to the injured worker while placing the burden
on carriers to demonstrate who is responsible for payments under the
workers compensation law.2"
Florida's workers compensation law permits the apportionment of
responsibility for payment of claims for multiple accidents among carriers
who insured the employer for different policy periods.29 The allocation of
responsibility between carriers is based upon the extent to which each
accident contributed to the claimant's need for medical care and disability
benefits." In the event subsequent injuries are determined to be the direct
and natural result of the original industrial injury, the carrier of record at the
time of the original injury will be held responsible for the payment of
benefits to the claimant.3
Apportionment may also be based upon the existence of a preexisting,
nondisabling, and asymptomatic condition. In Tejada v. Collection
Chevrolet, Inc.,32 the court noted that "when a preexisting condition is not
producing any disability at the time of the compensable accident, only that
portion of the claimant's current disability that is attributable to the normal
progress of the preexisting disease and thus would have occurred without
the aggravating accident may be apportioned."33 The court observed that
there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that the claimant
would have suffered a disability based on the preexisting condition,
independent of the compensable heart attack which formed the basis of
claimant's request for benefits.34  The court, therefore, concluded that
apportionment was not appropriate in this case and that compensability for
the entire claim was to be borne by the carrier of record at the time of the
heart attack."
27. Id. at 1161.
28. Florida workers compensation law allows for the application of apportionment
principles as prescribed by statute.
29. FLA. STAT. § 440.42(3) (1991).
30. CNA Ins. Co. v. Kemper Ins. Co., 596 So. 2d 81, 83 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
31. Id.
32. 594 So. 2d 340 (Fla. ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
33. Id. at 341 (citing Evans v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 196 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1967)).
34. Id.
35. See id.; see also Wood & Wood v. Dort, 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2090 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1993); Custom Architectural Metals v. Bradshaw, 623 So. 2d 804 (Fla.
Ist Dist Ct. App. 1993); Hyster Co. v. David, 612 So. 2d 678 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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B. Who Is Insured (General Section B)
You are insured if you are an employer named in Item I of the
Information Page. If that employer is a partnership, and if you are one
of its partners, you are insured, but only in your capacity as an
employer of the partnership's employees.36
The employer named on the Information Page is the insured entitled to
payment to its employees of benefits under the workers compensation law
of Florida should an injury by accident or by disease occur within the course
and scope of employment. 37 The insured is identified by its entity status,
and payment of claims is premised on employment by the entity named in
Item I of the Information Page.38 Multiple business entities may be
insured under the same policy provided they are under common majority
ownership.39
Florida amendments to the workers compensation law have established
a class of employer known as "statutory employer."4 ° Statutory employer
status was denied to a condominium association that entered into a contract
with a professional company to perform certain management and mainte-
nance duties.4 The court noted:
The concept of statutory employer, for worker's [sic] compensation
purposes, is that a contractor who sublets all or any part of its contract
work is the employer not only of its own employees but also of the
employees of any subcontractor to whom all or any part of the principal
contract has been sublet. It is absolutely basic, therefore, that one
cannot be a "contractor" (and thus a statutory employer) within the
meaning of this statute unless the "contractor" has a contractual
obligation, a portion of which is sublet to another.42
Since the condominium association could not demonstrate a contractual
obligation that was sublet to another, statutory employer status was denied
to the condominium association.43
36. POLICY, supra note 12.
37. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1991).
38. See GUIDE, supra note 9, at 24.
39. Id. at 3.
40. FLA. STAT. § 440.10(i)(b) (1991).
41. Woods v. Carpet Restorations, Inc., 611 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
42. Id. at 1304 (citing Jones v. Florida Power Corp., 72 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954)).
43. Id. at 1304-05. See also Marco Polo Hotel v. Popielarczyk, 622 So. 2d 104 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Hatch, 617 So. 2d 380 (Fla. ist
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Florida workers compensation law allows corporate officers to exempt
themselves out of the workers compensation law.44 Corporate officers who
elect this exemption are not entitled to benefits should they suffer an
occupational injury or disease. In Weber v. Dobbins,45 the Supreme Court
of Florida affirmed that a corporate officer who makes such an election does
not forfeit the right to exclusive remedy protection.46 The court decision
came in response to a question certified by the First District Court of
Appeal.47 The question affirmed was:
DO THE IMMUNITIES PROVIDED BY SECTION 440.11, FLORIDA
STATUTES (1983), EXTEND TO A CORPORATE OFFICER WHO
ELECTS, PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.05, TO EXEMPT HIMSELF
FROM COVERAGE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER
440?48
The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the intent of the WCELIP to provide
insurance for the employees of the named insured, even when that named
insured is not entitled to workers compensation benefits. 9
1. Exclusive Remedy
Employer status and compliance with the workers compensation law of
a state provides the employer with immunity from civil suit." An
employer may be subject to civil liability if an act of gross negligence led
to the injury.5" The 1988 amendments to the Florida Workers Compensa-
tion Act expanded the concept of statutory employee while raising the level
of intent from gross negligence to culpable negligence.52 The constitution-
ality of the level of intent required to impose immunity is discussed later in
this article.5: The expansion of the statutory employer definition is
examined first.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
44. FLA. STAT. § 440.05 (1991).
45. 616 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1993).
46. Id. at 957.
47. Dobbins v. Weber, 585 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
48. Weber, 616 So. 2d at 957.
49. Id.
50. See LARSON, supra note I, § 65.11.
51. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(I) (1991).
52. See FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (Supp. 1988).
53. See discussion infra note 56 and accompanying text.
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In Madaffer v. Managed Logistics Systems, Inc., the court deter-
mined that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defen-
dant/appellee, Managed Logistics Systems, Inc. ("MLS"), committed an
intentional tort, thereby removing the applicability of the exclusive remedy
of workers compensation." The court also noted that due to the 1988 law
change, 6 which might offer exclusive remedy protection to managers and
policy makers of MLS, the issue of whether the individual appellees held
those types of positions would need to be addressed on remand. 7 The
determination of the court demonstrates the tension between the statutes
governing workers compensation and the policy contract providing insurance
coverage for liability under such statutes. The policy intent is to cover the
named insured within the scope of its entity status as delineated on the
Information Page' The 1988 Florida law change provides:
The same immunity provisions enjoyed by an employer shall also apply
to any sole proprietor, partner, corporate officer or director, supervisor,
or other person who in the course and scope of his duties acts in a
managerial or policy-making capacity and the conduct which caused the
alleged injury arose within the course and scope of said managerial or
policy-making duties and was not a violation of a law, whether or not
a violation was charged, for which the maximum penalty which may be
imposed exceeds 60 days imprisonment as set forth in s. 775.082.58
Thus, it is possible that the intent of the policy will be overridden by state
law if that section of the statute, which expands the immunity from suit for
individuals who are identified by the statute, passes constitutional muster
without the culpable negligence provisions. Such an expansion of immunity
would limit the recovery of injured workers to the remedy available under
workers compensation law even when the injury is the result of the actions
of individuals who are not named insureds under the policy.
54. 601 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 2d Dist, Ct. App. 1992).
55. Id. at 1329.
56. The constitutionality of the 1988 law change was challenged in Shova v. Eller, 606
So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), on the basis that it raised the degree of negligence
required to maintain a civil tort action against a co-employee in a supervisory/managerial
position from gross negligence to culpable negligence. The law change was deemed
unconstitutional because it limited an injured employee's access to the courts. An appeal to
the Supreme Court of Florida is expected.
57. Madaffer, 601 So. 2d at 1329.
58. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (Supp. 1988).
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Statutory immunity can be extended to subcontractors when the
contractor sublets part or all of his contract work to a subcontractor or
subcontractors. 9 Under such a circumstance,
all of the employees of such contractor and subcontractor or subcon-
tractors engaged on such contract work shall be deemed to be employed
in one and the same business or establishment; and the contractor shall
be liable for, and shall secure, the payment of compensation to all such
employees, except to employees of a subcontractor who has secured
such payment.6"
In Walker i. United Steel Works, Inc.,6 the court applied this provision to
preclude a civil remedy to Walker against the subcontractor by whom he
was employed at the time of injury. Walker's claim was found to lie within
the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers compensation law.62
Similarly, the employee of a subcontractor was found to be limited to
the exclusive remedy of workers compensation where the workers compen-
sation coverage of the subcontractor immunized the contractor.63 Absent
a showing that the contractor's conduct was so outrageous as to be
considered an intentional tort, the claimant was limited to a workers
compensation remedy.64
Where a worker was injured while installing a door in a motel which
remained open to the public during renovations, the court determined that
the motel owner was not a "contractor" or "employer" and that the injured
worker was not an employee.65 The motel owner was not statutorily
required to provide workers compensation insurance and, therefore, was not
entitled to the exclusive remedy of workers compensation.66 The court
determined that the motel owner owed an independent duty of care to
persons legitimately on the premises to maintain the premises in a reason-
ably safe condition.67
The exclusive remedy was found to provide immunity where an
employee was killed, during an armed robbery, while employed as a security
59. FLA. STAT. § 440.10(6) (1991).
60. Id.
61. 606 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
62. Id.
63. Mathews Corp. v. Peters, 610 So. 2d I1I (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
64. Id.
65. Hogan v. Deerfield 21 Corp., 605 So. 2d 979, 982 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 983.
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guard.68 The court reviewed allegations of intentional tort on the part of
the employer and determined that the employee must show a deliberate
intent to injure or to engage in conduct that is substantially certain to result
in injury or death before the exclusive remedy shield can be broken.69
When, as here, the exclusive remedy of workers compensation is upheld and
narrowly construed, the intent of workers compensation law is accurately
and fairly interpreted to the benefit of all parties. When the exclusive
remedy doctrine is eroded, the workers compensation system fails and
employers are exposed to liability, which was not intended by the no-fault
workers compensation system. The decisions of Florida courts have served
to support the exclusive remedy doctrine while acknowledging the erosion
granted by the Legislature.7"
While the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida have generally
supported the exclusive remedy doctrine, the court found that the exclusive
remedy did not apply in Commercial Coatings of Northwest Florida, Inc. v.
Pensacola Concrete Construction Co.71 However, the court limited its
findings to the unique facts of the case.72 The injured worker had been
awarded workers compensation benefits and then filed a suit in tort against
the company which had loaned his employer a dangerous instrumentality.73
The employee was awarded damages against the third party tortfeasor which
then sought indemnification from the employer.74 The court noted that the
question before it was whether the contractor whose employees used the
instrumentality negligently should pay the judgment, or whether the non-
negligent owner of the instrumentality should pay. 75 The court held the
negligent employer liable for indemnification due to principles of equity and
common law, but noted that under workers compensation principles the
68. Folk v. Rite Aid of Florida, Inc., 611 So. 2d 35, 36-37 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
69. Id. at 37 (citing Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla.
1986)). Relying on its decision in Folk, the court affirmed an intentional tort exception to
the exclusive remedy doctrine in Power Plant Maintenance Co. v. Gardner, 617 So. 2d 462
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) and Florida Power & Light Co. v. Gardner, 617 So. 2d 463
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
70. See discussion supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
71. 616 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 1993).
72. Id. at 963.
73. Id. at 960.
74. Id. at 961; see Pensacola Concrete Constr. Co. v. Commercial Coatings ofN.W. Fla.,
Inc., 595 So. 2d 145, 146 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992), approved, 616 So. 2d 960 (Fla.
1993).
75. Commercial Coatings, 616 So. 2d at 963.
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employer should not have been subject to both judgments.76 The unusual
facts in this case and the language of the decision should limit the
applicability of this decision and should not represent a threat to the
exclusive remedy doctrine in Florida.
There are times when a claimant will seek to avoid the exclusive
remedy in order to proceed with a suit against the corporate officers. In
Tomlinson v. Miller,77 claimant sought to establish gross negligence on the
part of the corporate employers. The claimant worked in a convenience
store in a remote area and was abducted and raped. The court determined
that the claimant failed to allege facts which would establish a clear and
present risk of injury, and affirmed the summary judgment entered by the
trial court." In a special concurrence, Judge Cobb noted that precedent
and applicable law at the time of the occurrence led to the summary
judgment fir the defense.79 Accordingly, the claimant could recover under
workers compensation law for the bodily injury by accident, but did not
have a remedy in tort. Recent law changes, however, now place a greater
burden on the employer, and future decisions might therefore be differ-
ent.8" Similarly, a claimant's estate was denied a tort remedy where the
claimant was kidnapped by a former employee and forced to open the
company safe before being stabbed to death.8 The court found that the
injury was the direct result of the employment and was compensable under
workers compensation law.82
Corporate officers, however, do not always escape personal liability
when an injury arises in the course and scope of employment. In Foreman
v. Russo,83 a jury found three of the corporate defendants grossly negligent
and not entitled to the exclusive remedy of workers compensation. Russo
was severely injured when a vehicle ran into his stopped garbage truck. His
complaint of gross negligence included the removal of lights from the truck,
addition of a winch to the truck which necessitated the removal of the lights,
76. Id.
77. 617 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). A claimant may also seek to bring
suit against a co-employee when the co-employee has committed an act of gross-negligence.
Absent such an act, the co-employee has the immunity of the employer. See, e.g., Jones v.
Robinson, 618 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (gross negligence was not
demonstrated and ordinary negligence is insufficient to allow a suit against a co-employee).
78. Tomlinson, 617 So. 2d at 811.
79. Id. (Cobb, J., concurring specially).
80. Id.
81. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Parks, 620 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
82. Id. at 800.
83. 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1962 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1993).
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a uniform provided by the company which was the same color as the truck,
failure to provide cones, flares or warning devices to be placed around the
garbage truck and requiring Russo to make known illegal pickups. The
court on appeal affirmed the decision below. 4
Workers compensation while designed as a no-fault system, was not
meant to provide a shelter for employers who show wanton disregard for the
welfare and safety of their employees. The system works when employers
and employees are aware of their responsibilities to each other and each acts
with the intent of providing a safe workplace.
C. Workers Compensation Law (General Section C)
Workers Compensation Law means the workers or workmen's compen-
sation law of each state or territory named in Item 3.A. of the Informa-
tion Page. It includes any amendments to that law which are in effect
during the policy period. It does not include the provisions of law that
provides nonoccupational disability benefits.85
This section of the policy is intended to provide a definition of workers
compensation that limits the coverage of the policy to the workers
compensation laws of the states and that excludes coverage under federal
acts and under acts that provide non-occupational disability benefits.86 The
exclusion of coverage for non-occupational disability benefits is based on
the laws of several states87 which require that employers provide short term
disability benefits to employees who are injured in non-job related accidents
or by non-job related diseases.88
84. Id. at D1963.
85. POLICY, supra note 12.
86. Federal coverages are available by endorsement for the Longshore and Harbor
Workers Act, the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, the Defense Base Act, the Federal
Employers Liability Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Act and the Nonappropriated Funds
Instrumentalities Act. Maritime coverage is available, although this is generally limited to
the deductible limits of the P&I Policy. The P&I Policy is the accepted insurance mechanism
for providing maritime coverage.
87. The states are Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. See LARSON,
supra note I, § 65.11.
88. See id § 96.40.
[Vol. 18
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 11
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/11
1993]
D. State (General Section D)
State means any of the United States of America, and the District of
Columbia.89
This section of the policy is intended to delineate the geographic
limitations of WCELIP statutory applicability. It is the laws of the states
and the District of Columbia that serve as the statutory basis for the
provision of coverage. Coverage for United States territories is governed
by the laws of those territories. Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin
Islands provide workers compensation by means of monopolistic funds, and
private insurers may not issue policies in these territories. 90 American
Samoa and Guam provide for the issuance of WCELIPs by private
insurers.9 Since state law governs the coverage available by means of the
WCELIP, the applicability of the WCELIP in foreign countries is governed
by the extra-territorial provisions of state workers compensation law.
E. Locations (General Section E)
This policy covers all your workplaces listed in Item I or 4 of the
Information Page; and it covers all other workplaces in Item 3.A. unless
you have other insurance or are self-insured for such workplaces.92
While state statutes vary, most require that the full liability of
employers, under workers compensation laws, be insured under one
policy.93 In Florida, full coverage is based upon the decision in Nation-
wide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ed Soules Construction Co.94 A recent
filing9 by the National Council on Compensation Insurance permits less
89. POLICY, supra note 12.
90. GUIDE, supra note 8, at 4.
91. Id.
92. POLICY, supra note 12.
93. See generally LARSON, supra note I, § 93.00.
94. 397 So. 2d 775 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
95. The National Council on Compensation Insurance filed Items B-1210 and B-1265
on behalf of its members and subscribers. Florida implemented employee leasing rules in
February 1990. it was the first state to implement such rules. Florida adopted the filing of
the National Council on Compensation Insurance to replace its original rules effective April
1, 1990. To date, no litigation has reached the appellate level of review in regard to the
employee leasing rules.
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than the full liability of the employer to be covered by a WCELIP in those
instances in which employees are leased.96
III. PART ONE-WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE
A. How This Insurance Applies (Part One A)
This workers compensation insurance applies to bodily injury by
accident or bodily injury by disease. Bodily injury includes resulting
death.
1. Bodily injury by accident must occur within the policy period.
2. Bodily injury by disease must be caused or aggravated by the
conditions of your employment. The employee's last day of last expo-
sure to the conditions causing or aggravating such bodily injury by
disease must occur during the policy period.97
This section of the policy sets the period within which the injury must
occur in order for the policy to respond to a claim. While it is fairly clear
that an injury by accident must occur within the term of the policy, and this
is a relatively easy matter to prove, injury by disease poses different
problems. An injury by disease does not necessarily manifest itself within
the policy term. It is, therefore, necessary to establish during which policy
period there was exposure to the conditions that caused or aggravated the
disease.
Benefits under workers compensation law are payable to an employee
involved in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment that
causes disabling injury. In Wright v. Douglas N. Higgins, Inc.,9" the court
determined that where an employee relationship did not exist, the passive
acceptance of workers compensation benefits was not an election of
remedies.99 The injury occurred following a job interview and try-out
96. Employee leasing is a methodology that permits employers to utilize workers who
are employees of a firm that specializes in the placement of workers. The leasing firm
generally hires, fires, and provides benefits for leased workers. Since the workers
compensation premium system is premised on a loss sensitive program, it is important that
the loss experience of the utilizing employer be applied to the base premium. In order to
accomplish this end, while allowing leasing companies to provide services to the utilizing
employer, multiple coordinated policies are used.
97. POLICY, supra note 12.
98. 617 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, _ So. 2d _ (Fla. 1993).
99. See id. at 462.
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work period while the claimant was awaiting a hiring decision. 00 During
this time the claimant assisted employees in need of help, but did so
voluntarily and without direction or request.'' The court determined that
an employee relationship was not established (therefore the injury could not
arise out of or occur in the course of employment) and that a civil remedy
was available to the claimant.0 2 The amount paid to the claimant in
workers compensation benefits would be deducted from any award received
by the claimant.'0 3 The employee was not entitled to receive additional
workers compensation benefits while awaiting a civil settlement.
0 4
B. We Will Pay (Part One B)
We will pay promptly when due benefits required of you by the
workers compensation law.' 5
This statement represents the basic insuring agreement. It is this
statement that obligates the insurer to pay the benefits required under the
workers compensation law of each state or territory listed in Item 3.A. of
the Information Page. An examination of the cases adjudicated by the First
District Court of Appeal provides insight into the workers compensation law
of Florida.
1. Rulemaking Authority
Primary to any analysis of a statute is the basis of the rulemaking
authority by which the statute is implemented. The Workers Compensation
Rules of Procedure are established under the rulemaking authority of the
Supreme Court of Florida.'0 6 The rulemaking authority of the Supreme
Court of Florida was challenged in Reddick v. Charles W. Infinger
Construction,'°7 which sought review of Amendments to Florida Rules of
100. Id. at 461.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Wright, 617 So. 2d at 462.
104. Id.
105. PoLICY, supra note 12.
106. See In re Florida Workers' Compensation Rules of Procedure, 374 So. 2d 981 (Fla.
1979); In re Workmen's Compensation Rules of Procedure, 343 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1977); In
re Florida Workmen's Compensation Rules of Procedure, 285 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1973).
107. 617 So. 2d 723 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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Workers' Compensation Procedure' on the premise that the Supreme
Court of Florida had incorrectly established its rulemaking authority by
means of article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution and that workers
compensation hearings before judges of compensation claims are not
conducted in article V courts.' °9 The First District Court of Appeal noted
that the rulemaking authority of the Supreme Court of Florida is based upon
that court's "unequivocal" textual reliance on section 440.29(3) of the
Florida Statutes,"' and therefore found that section 440.13(2)(k) of the
Florida Statutes"'. does not impermissibly encroach upon the supreme
court's rulemaking authority under article V." 2
2. Jurisdiction
In addition to rules by which to function, jurisdiction must be vested
in a tribunal in order for a claim to be heard in that forum. The 1990
amendments to Florida's Workers Compensation law created changes in the
jurisdiction of the judges of compensation claims." 3 In Terners of Miami
Corp. v. Freshwater,"4 the decision of a JCC as to the fees to be paid to
a treating physician was overturned on the basis of the 1990 amend-
ments. 115 Prior to the amendments, jurisdiction to resolve a fee dispute
was vested with the judges of compensation claims." 6 The amendments
vested the authority for resolution of such conflicts in the Division of
Workers Compensation." 7 Although the fee dispute arose and was filed
prior to the amendments to the workers compensation law, the dispute was
not placed before the judge of compensation claims until after jurisdiction
108. 603 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1992), review denied, _ So. 2d _ (Fla. 1993).
109. Reddick, 617 So. 2d at 724.
110. FLA. STAT. § 440.29(3) (1991). "The practice and procedure before the judges of
compensation claims shall be governed by rules adopted by the Supreme Court, except to the
extent that such rules conflict with the provisions of this chapter." Id.
111. Id. § 440.13(2)(k). This section provides that an employer, carrier, self-insurer,
health care provider, or rehabilitation provider shall not refer an injured worker to a facility
in which the entity has an ownership or financial interest unless full disclosure of the interest
has been made in writing to the employer and the injured worker. Id.
112. Reddick, 617 So. 2d at 724.
113. See FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(i)(1) (Supp. 1990).
114. 599 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
115. Id at 675.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 674.
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no longer existed."' The JCC, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to hear the
claim.'' 9
Within the jurisdiction of the First District Court of Appeal is the right
to determine the evidence which may be presented to the JCC. In Ogden
Allied Services v. Panesso,2 ° the court addressed the admission of surveil-
lance video tapes made after plaintiff's request for production and following
the employer/carrier's request for a postponement. While the court allowed
the admission of the video tapes, it did so only after examination of the
current Florida Rules of Workers Compensation Procedure. The court noted
that the rules result in "trial by ambush" and requested that the Workers
Compensation Rules Committee of the Florida Bar address the problem.''
In the process of hearing the issue in Ogden, the court was extensively
briefed prior to oral argument.' 2 The court received notices of supple-
mental authority as late as the morning of the oral argument. On its own
motion the court struck the last notice of supplemental authority and noted
that in the future it would take the same action when confronted with an
abuse of the rules of procedure relating to notice of supplemental authori-
ty.
23
Where a claimant does not request a specific type of benefit, and the
benefits awarded were not clearly placed at issue, the court reversed the
order of the JCC. 24 Due process requires that the parties have notice of
the issues to be heard so that they may present an adequate defense. 5
When the issues are not clearly presented, the JCC lacks jurisdiction to hear
the matter and an award cannot be made.
In Wolk v. Jaylen Homes, Inc., 6 the court examined whether the
JCC has the jurisdiction to consider claims for medical benefits when such
benefits have been terminated due to an employer/carrier's determination of
overutilization. The court determined that overutilization is a matter within
the jurisdiction of the JCC and that unilateral termination of treatment
118. Id. at 675; see also Napp-Deady Assocs. v. Ramsey, 599 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1 st Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
119. Terners of Miami Corp., 599 So. 2d at 675.
120. 619 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. Ist Dist Ct. App. 1993).
121. Id. at 1026-27.
122. Ogden Allied Servs. v. Panesso, 619 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(per curiam) (the court issued a separate opinion on the issue of supplemental authority).
123. Id.
124. Florida Power Corp. v. Hamilton, 617 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
125. Id. at 334.
126. 593 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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without good cause is a violation of the review procedures of the Florida
Statutes.'27
3. Statute of Limitations
Florida statute provides that a workers compensation claim must be
filed within two years of the time of injury, the date of the last payment of
compensation, or of the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the
employer.'28 In Lee v. City of Jacksonville,'29 a claimant argued that
continued use of a transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulator unit to relieve
pain in an injured knee constituted continued remedial treatment by the
employer, sufficient to allow continued benefits. 3 ° The court noted that
decisions in other cases appeared to place the burden on the claimant to
prove that the employer had knowledge of the claimant's use of a prescribed
medical device in order to toll the statute of limitations.' 3' Based upon
prior decisions, the court affirmed the JCC's dismissal of the claim on the
ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. 32  The court
certified the following question as being of great public importance:
WHETHER THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD OF SECTION 440.19
(1)(A), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS TOLLED BY THE CLAIMANT'S
ROUTINE USE OF A DEPENDENCY-INDUCING MEDICAL
DEVICE FURNISHED BY THE EMPLOYER AND PRESCRIBED
BY THE AUTHORIZED PHYSICIAN FOR AN INDEFINITE PERI-
OD OF TIME WITHOUT SUPERVISION, EVEN THOUGH THE
EMPLOYER DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE THE CLAI-
MANT CONTINUED TO USE THE DEVICE BEYOND THE TIME
THE PHYSICIAN SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE CLAIMANT
TO DISCONTINUE USE OF THE DEVICE, AND NO SUCH
INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN.'33
127. Id. at 1060.
128. FLA. STAT. § 440.19(I)(a) (1991).
129. 598 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992), approved, 616 So. 2d 37 (Fla.
1993).
130. Id. at 296.
131. Id. at 297. The court relied on its decisions in Devilling v. Rimes, Inc., 591 So.
2d 304 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991), and Taylor v. Metropolitan Dade County, 596 So. 2d
798 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992), to support its holding in Lee.
132. Lee, 598 So. 2d at 296.
133. Id. at 297.
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The Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question in the
negative and approved the decision of the district court.134 Effectively, the
supreme court determined that actual knowledge on the part of the employer
is essential to the establishment of treatment "furnished by the employ-
er."
1 35
In Bell v. Commercial Carriers,'36 the court examined whether an
employer has to voluntarily intend remedial treatment in order to revive the
statute of limitations. 37 The claimant had suffered a 1981 back injury and
was receiving ongoing treatment when a second back injury occurred in
1989.138 The JCC accepted the treatment as remedial to the 1989 injury,
but not remedial to the 1981 injury, thus barring the claim.' 39 The court
reversed the findings of the JCC and requested that the claim be heard on
its merits.40
In another case, the court reversed the decision of the JCC, which had
ordered the employer/carrier to provide remedial attention for replacement
or removal of a surgical staple in the claimant's right shoulder.' 4' The
court determined that the staple was not a prosthetic device, and that the two
year statute of limitations had therefore run.' 42 The court, however,
certified the following question as one of great public importance:
WAS THE FIXATION STAPLE INSERTED INTO CLAIMANT'S
SHOULDER A "PROSTHETIC DEVICE," AS THAT TERM IS USED
IN SECTION 440.19(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985)?141
The Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question in the
negative, thus affirming the decision of the district court.' 44 This decision
barred the workers compensation remedy since the statute of limitations had
run. 145
134. Lee v. City of Jacksonville, 616 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1993).
135. Id. at 38.
136. 603 So. 2d 683 (Fla. Ist. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
137. Id. at 685.
138. Id. at 684.
139. Id. at 685.
140. Id.
141. Universal Rivet, Inc. v. Cash, 598 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App 1992),
approved, 616 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1993).
142. Id. at 158.
143. Id.
144. Cash v. Universal Rivet, Inc., 616 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1993).
145. Id. at 448.
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The court also addressed the statute of limitations in Timmeny v.
Tropical Botanicals Corp. 14 6 The Timmeny court determined that where
the employer/carrier had failed to notify the claimant of an entitlement to
benefits the employer/carrier was estopped from asserting the statute of
limitations as a defense.'47 The court took the view that the conduct of
the employer/carrier severely prejudiced the claimant. The employer/carrier
was aware that the employee was exposed to pesticides which were among
the possible causes of the claimant's aplastic anemia.'48 Nonetheless, the
employer/carrier did not share this information with the claimant. The
employer/carrier's breach of its statutory duty requires that the statute be
tolled until the claimant received actual notice that his disease was
compensable.' 49
4. Standard of Review
Review of workers compensation cases by the First District Court of
Appeal is generally based upon a standard of competent substantial
evidence. 5 ° The court in Lagenfelder v. Regina 5' utilized this standard
to find that a claimant was entitled to permanent total disability benefits and
costs. At the same time, the court determined there was a lack of competent
substantial evidence to support an award for attendant care benefits.'
The court found that there was no need for lengthy presentation of the facts
in the case, as these would be of little precedential value.'53 In essence,
the court implied that it knows competent substantial evidence when it sees
it. 154
The decision of the JCC, as to a good faith work search by a claimant
and the award of permanent total disability benefits, was found to be lacking
for want of competent substantial evidence where the court found the
146. 615 So. 2d 811 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
147. Id. at 816.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 817.
150. See, e.g., Vista Manor Nursing Home v. Yeager, 605 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); State v. Vice, 601 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Collins v.
Catalytic, Inc., 597 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
151. 601 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also Allied Bendix Galactic v. AI-Hafiz, 596 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App.), review denied, 605 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1992).
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evidence to be "vague and general."' 5  Although the court reviews the
facts of the case, it does not examine or explain what constitutes competent
substantial evidence. Thus, the decision typically turns on the whim of the
court, with no true standard to guide the practitioner in determining the
evidence that should be entered into the record." 6
In some instances the court provides somewhat more insight into what
constitutes competent substantial evidence. Where the JCC failed to
determine that medical treatment was of an emergency nature, the First
District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for further findings." 7
Even though the carrier may control the medical treatment of the injured
employee by the selection of the treating physician, an injured worker may
not be denied compensation for medical treatment which, although
unauthorized, is of an emergency nature.'
In another instance, however, the court upheld an average weekly wage
("AWW") award which included fringe benefits of pass flights to the
employee where the court found competent substantial evidence in the
record to establish the value of this benefit.5 9 The JCC found that the
pass flights could be valued at 8.1 cents per mile and thus included the
value of the pass in the AWW calculation. In a dissenting opinion, Judge
Miner took issue with the analysis of the certified public accountant who
presented the testimony as to this benefit. 6° The majority accepted the
validity of the evidence as presented to and reported by the JCC, while the
dissent attempted to reevaluate the evidence. Reevaluation of the evidence
is outside the scope of review of competent substantial evidence.'
61
155. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Challis, 609 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
156. The court is somewhat more prone to offer explanation of what is not competent,
substantial evidence then it is to provide an affirmative guideline. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Columbia Pictures, 610 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Townsend & Bottom v.
Bonds, 610 So. 2d 619 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Jackson Manor Nursing Home v. Ortiz,
606 So. 2d 422 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
157. Machacon v. Velda Farms Dairy, 619 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
158. Id. at 382.
159. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Michaelis, 619 So. 2d 383 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
160. Id. at 383-84. (Miner, J., dissenting).
161. Other cases in which the First District Court of Appeal reviewed findings of the
JCC on the basis of competent substantial evidence include: UlIman v. City of Tampa Parks
Dep't, 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2043 (Fla. Ist Dist Ct. App. Sept. 15, 1993) (affirming that there
was competent substantial evidence that there was no industrial accident); WPOM Partners
v. Lovell, 623 So. 2d 823 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming wage loss award because
record contains competent substantial evidence of claimant's loss of earnings and his
compensable injury); Orange County Sch. Bd. v. Perkins, 619 So. 2d I (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
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In the event that a JCC has departed from the essential requirements of
law, and a party will suffer an injury that cannot be remedied by appeal, a
petition for certiorari may be filed with the court. In Spaulding v.
Albertson's, Inc.,' 62 the court reviewed the evidence necessary to deter-
mine whether the JCC had complied with the essential requirements of law
for the purpose of establishing attorney's fees.'63 The court held that the
JCC erred in finding that the statutory fee guidelines in section 440.34(1) of
the Florida Statutes was the appropriate place to begin the determination of
appellate attorney's fees in workers compensation cases.'64 While the
court noted that an award of appellate attorney's fees does not lend itself to
any hard and fast rule, it took pains to note that claimant's attorney's fees
should not be governed by evidence of the hourly rate charged by defense
App. 1993) (en banc) (affirming the JCC's refusal to dismiss for lack of prosecution); T.E.
James Constr. Co. v. Hartley, 616 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding there
was insufficient competent substantial evidence to support the award of temporary total
disability benefits, but there was sufficient competent substantial evidence to establish
statutory employer status); Metropolitan Dade County v. Pope, 615 So. 2d 856 (Fla. I st Dist.
Ct. App. 1993) (reversing an award of palliative chiropractic care where there was no
competent substantial evidence to support the award); Rodriguez v. Albertson's, 614 So. 2d
678 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing and remanding where there was no competent
substantial evidence to sustain the denial of wage loss benefits); Perkins v. A. Perkins
Drywall 615 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing a denial of compensation
claim where there was competent substantial evidence that the parties had stipulated to
employment status and the JCC found no coverage under the policy due to misrepresentation
of the employment status); Hewett v. Town of Mayo, 614 So. 2d 598 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (reversed and remanded where there were internal inconsistencies in the evidence);
Solinsky v. Goody Bake Shop, 622 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming JCC's
finding concerning social security offset); Charles v. Suwannee Swifly, 622 So. 2d 114 (Fla.
Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing and remanding where JCC rejected unrefuted medical
testimony); Alford v. G. Pierce Woods Memorial Hosp., 621 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. Ist Dist Ct.
App. 1993) (affirming denial of authorization for chiropractic treatment); Farm Stores, Inc.
v. Fletcher, 621 So. 2d 706 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming in part, reversing in
part, and remanding where JCC failed to order an independent dental examination and
wrongly found the claimant to be permanently totally disabled); Espinal v. Victor Herrera
Drywall Stockers, Inc., 610 So. 2d 660 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing and
remanding a decision on MMI where there was evidence that further improvement could take
place); and City of West Palm Beach v. Dahl, 610 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(reversing and remanding the wage loss benefit determination of the JCC where the JCC
overlooked or ignored evidence that claimant was offered a position within his physical
restrictions).
162. 610 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
163. Id. at 722.
164. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.34(1) (1989).
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lawyers. 6 :  The court also noted that there are inherent differences
between the practice of the defense bar, which begin with fixed hourly rates
for defense counsel based upon repetitive employment and virtual guarantees
of payment from solvent insurance companies, and handling appeals for
workers compensation employers.'66 The court's comments appear at odds
with recent changes to the legislative intent of the workers compensation
law, which is now to be construed in a fair and balanced manner in regard
to application to employee and employer.'67
The court also accepted a petition for a writ of certiorari in All Weather
Control, Inc. v. Wawerczyk. 68 Here the court examined an order for out-
of-state medical care and determined that the petition should be granted
since, once the fee for out-of-state medical care was paid, there was no
statutory method for reimbursement.'69 Thus, the petitioner would suffer
an injury that could not be remedied by an appeal from the final order. 7°
The court also found a departure from the essential requirements of law
in a petition for a writ of certiorari where there was no evidence presented
to the JCC. 7' The petition for a writ of certiorari sought review of an
order of a JCC which granted the employer/carrier's motion to compel
treatment with a medical representative of the employer/carrier, and denied
a motion to require the presence of claimant's attorney at all meetings be-
tween the medical representative and the claimant.'72
An order compelling disclosure of a company's workers compensation
file on two employees was found to depart "from the essential requirements
of law," and to present a possibility of "irreparable harm that cannot be
remedied by way of appeal" in Adjustco, Inc. v. Sibley.'73 The court
determined that the party seeking production failed to show that there was
no other means to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials without
undue hardship.'74 In the remand instructions, respondent was given the
165. Id. at 723-24.
166. Id. at 724.
167. See FLA. STAT. § 440.01 (1991).
168. 600 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
169. Id. at 518.
170. Id.
171. Martinez v. Purdue Frederick Co., 599 So. 2d 772, 773 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
172. Id.
173. 611 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
174. Id.
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opportunity to present evidence that the material was not available by other
means without undue hardship.'
In a consolidated case, the court denied petitioner's request for a writ
of certiorari, which tested the provisions of Florida law pertaining to
disclosure of medical records.'76 The court applied the provisions of the
1991 amendments to the Act because the statutory disclosure provisions
related to matters that did not alter or amend the parties substantive
rights.'77 Additionally, the court noted that the language of the 1989,
1990, and 1991 amendments was not significantly different. 7  The
petitions sought review of an order of the JCC prohibiting petitioners or
their representatives from exparte communication with respondents' medical
providers. 79 The court determined that petitioners had not met their
burden of proving that the order departed from the essential requirements of
law, and that they would suffer material harm that could not be remedied
on appeal. 80
In Fuentes v. Caribbean Electric,'8' the First District Court of Appeal
addressed the issue of unrebutted medical testimony. The court noted that
a JCC may not reject unrebutted medical testimony without a reasonable
explanation.'82 Here, no explanation for the rejection was offered and,
therefore, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case for proceed-
ings consistent with its opinion." 3
Amendments to Florida Rules of Workers' Compensation Proce-
dure"'84 provides for discretionary review of non-final venue orders in
workers compensation cases.'85 A petition for a writ of certiorari was
granted in regard to a venue order of the JCC in Lockheed Space Operations
v. Pham.8 6 Procedurally, the court received this case as an appeal of a
non-final order. The court determined that, although it did not have
jurisdiction to hear such an appeal, it was within the power of the court to
175. Id.
176. Adelman Steel Corp. v. Winter, 610 So. 2d 494, 496-97 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
177. Id. at 497.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 496.
180. Id. at 496-97.
181. 596 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
182. Id. at 1229.
183. Id.
184. 603 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1992).
185. Id.
186. 600 So. 2d 1261, 1264 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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view the appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari.' 87 The court then
proceeded to vacate the order of the JCC transferring venue."'8
In Florida Mining & Materials v. Perkins,'89 the court found that the
JCC utilized the wrong evidentiary standard to determine that there was a
lack of evidence to support a finding of reliance upon a misrepresentation
in the hiring process. The employer asserted that there was a direct causal
relationship between the injury and the misrepresentation on the part of the
claimant.
The court was asked to accept a petition for a writ of certiorari in
regard to a non-final order on venue in Hines Electric v. McClure.9 ° The
court determined that the non-final order was appealable and exercised its
jurisdiction by accepting the jurisdiction and determining that the answers
it had received were answer briefs.' The appellant was subsequently
given twenly days to forward a reply brief to the court.
5. Arising Out Of, And In the Course
and Scope of, Employment
The payment of workers compensation benefits is dependent on an
injury arising out of, and in the course and scope of, employment.' 92 In
Darling v. Conley Buick, Inc.,93 the court reversed an order of the JCC,
finding that injuries sustained in an automobile accident were not compensa-
ble under workers compensation.' 94 The employee, a used car salesman,
was delivering vehicle documents to a customer at the employer's request
when the accident occurred. 195 Although the JCC found these actions to
be within the course and scope of employment, the JCC determined that by
driving five miles beyond the destination of the customer's residence, the
claimant had substantially deviated from the course and scope of employ-
ment.'96  The JCC concluded the claim was not compensable.' 97  The
appellate court held that the JCC's determination was not supported by
187. Id. at 1261-62.
188. Id. at 1262.
189. 612 So. 2d 667, 668 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
190. 616 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Ist Dist Ct. App. 1993).
191. Id. at 137.
192. See generally LARSON supra note 1, § 1.00.
193. 594 So. 2d 815 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
194. Id. at 816.
195. Id. at 815.
196. Id. at 816.
197. Id.
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competent and substantial evidence, and reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings.' 98
The finding that the claimant was in a position unique to employment
and that the injury was not the result of an idiopathic condition was upheld
in City of Plantation v. Seaman.'99 Although the claimant passed the
necessary threshold of establishing that the injury was compensable because
it arose out of and occurred within the course and scope of employment, the
case was remanded to the JCC for review of compliance with statutory
procedures relating to reporting requirements."'
In the case of individuals who are municipal or other specified
employees, statutory presumptions may apply. 0' In State of Florida,
Department of Corrections v. Clark,"2 the court determined that a fireman
did not show that he was a fireman for a "fire control district" within the
meaning of the Florida Statutes.20 3 The claimant asserted he was entitled
to the presumption of compensability contained in section 112.18(1) of the
Florida Statutes. 24 The presumption states:
Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida municipal,
county, port authority, special tax district or fire control district fireman
caused by tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total
or partial disability or death shall be presumed to have been accidental
and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless contrary be shown
by competent evidence.2"5
Workers compensation law has long recognized that injuries which
occur during travel to and from work do not arise out of, and in the course
and scope of, employment. Over the years, exceptions have been carved out
of the going and coming rule which would allow recovery in those instances
in which a "special hazard" exists. In Florida, the "special hazard" rule was
adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida in Naranja Rock Co. v. Dawal
Farms."6 The rule states that "(w)here there is a special hazard on a
198. Darling, 594 So. 2d at 816.
199. 590 So. 2d I (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
200. Id. at 1-2; see also FLA. STAT. § 440.13 (1991) (for billing and reporting require-
ments).
201. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 112.18 (1991).
202. 593 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
203. Id. at 586.
204. Id. (citing Fla. Stat. § 112.18(1) (1991)).
205. FLA. STAT. § 112.18(1) (1991).
206. 74 So. 2d 282, 286 (Fla. 1954).
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normal route used by the employee as a means of entry to and exit from his
place of work, the hazards of that route under appropriate circumstances
become hazards of the employment."2 °7  The special hazard rule was
found not to apply where an employee slipped and fell in a parking lot on
her way to work.2"' The court noted that for a claimant to be entitled to
compensation under the special hazard rule, the "claimant must demonstrate
the existence of a special hazard at a particular off-premises location which
is on the usual or expected means of access to the claimant's place of
employment., 2 9 The claimant in the instant case was unable to make
such a showing.2"'
Similarly, a "travelling employee" exception has been established which
provides that when an employee is away from home, injuries may be
compensable for daily living events. 21 ' However, the court declined to
extend workers compensation benefits to employees who were injured while
being transported by a co-employee who was voluntarily transporting the
other employees in a privately owned vehicle, between the employees' place
of work and their temporary residence, while working for the employer
away from their normal place of residence.' The court thus restricted its
decision to the original intent of workers compensation law, which was to
provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course and scope
of employment.
6. Employee v. Independent Contractor
Workers compensation law is designed to provide medical and wage
replacement benefits to injured employees.2"3 The common law test
applicable to master/servant law is traditionally the "control test."2 4  In
Buncy v. Certified Grocers,2"5 the court determined that a claimant's
wages should include compensation as a confidential informant. The court
207. Id. (citations omitted).
208. Kash-N-Karry v. Johnson, 617 So. 2d 791 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
209. Id. at 793.
210. Id. at 793-94.
211. FLA. STAT. § 440.092(4) (1991).
212. Fierro v. Crom Corp., 617 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
213. See generally LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.00.
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a) (1958). In determining whether
an individual is an independent contractor or employee, "the extent of control which, by
agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work" is one factor considered.
Id.
215. 592 So. 2d 336 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
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noted that the degree of control exercised over appellant's activities was re-
flected in the record and constituted competent substantial evidence that
claimant was an employee, even when working as a confidential infor-
mant.2" 6
In Fleitas v. Today Trucking, Inc.,217 the court affirmed a JCC's
decision that the claimant was an independent contractor who was entitled
to limited benefits under a contractual relationship with Today Trucking,
Inc. The claimant was injured in an automobile accident while driving for
the defendant, Today Trucking, Inc. The claimant had entered into an
agreement with the company, which agreement established that the claimant
was not an employee, but would be entitled to workers compensation
payments in the amount of $240.00 per week. The court found that
Florida's workers compensation statute prohibits contractual limitation of the
benefits due an employee."' At the same time, there is no statutory
prohibition in regard to establishing limits for benefits to be paid to
individuals who are not employees, yet are extended voluntary benefits by
the employer.2"9 Thus, the claimant in the instant case was only entitled
to limited benefits. 2 °
7. Causal Relationship
Compensability for an injury is premised on the understanding that the
employment was causally related to the injury.22' In Finney v. Agrico
Chemical Co.,222 the court reversed a determination of noncompensability
and remanded for further proceedings where the testimony of two doctors
was improperly rejected by the JCC. 2 23  The claimant in Finney was
working as an electrical technician trainee when he slipped and fell on his
back, striking his head on the floor.224 The claimant filed a timely report,
but did not immediately seek medical treatment. 225 The court determined
216. Id. at 337-38.
217. 598 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
218. Id. at 254.
219. Id.; see also Fort Pierce Tribune v. Williams, 622 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
220. Fleitas, 598 So. 2d at 254.
221. See generally LARSON, supra note 1, at § 20.00.
222. 599 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
223. Id. at 1361.
224. Id at 1360.
225. Id
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that reversal was necessary where the rejected medical evidence, if accepted,
would provide legally sufficient grounds for establishing the claim.226
The court also reversed and remanded for further findings the decision
of the JCC as to a causal relationship where there was uncontradicted
testimony that the condition was causally related to the employment.227
In addition to rejecting the uncontradicted medical testimony of two doctors,
the JCC used the claimant's failure to conduct an adequate job search as the
basis for finding lack of causation.228 The court, however, did not
comment on the use of an inadequate work search as the basis for finding
lack of a causal relationship.229 The court did note that the claimant had
not been informed by the carrier of the need to perform a work search and,
thus, the claimant was excused from the need to have made such a
search .230
The court also reversed and remanded the decision of a JCC in regard
to causal relationship where the claimant worked as a night auditor for a
motel chain and filed a claim in connection with a hand and wrist inju-
ry.231  The court determined that, in order to rule against the causal
connection, the JCC had to find as uncontested the testimony of medical
experts. The court found, however, that the testimony was clearly conflict-
ing.232  During claimant's delivery of a baby, claimant's wrists were
strapped. Medical testimony indicated that the strapping "could be
something of significance to cause carpal tunnel" and that subsequent lifting
of the child "could cause tenosynovitis." '233 Since this testimony was in
226. Id. at 1361.
227. Cozzens v. St. Joe Container Co., 596 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992). See also Phillips v. Hague Water Conditioning, 616 So. 2d 507 (Fla. ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (.CC reversed where there was unrefuted testimony that current condition was
work related).
228. Cozzens, 596 So. 2d at 137.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Fritz v. Courtyard By Marriott, 592 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
See also Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Schmitt, 597 So. 2d 938 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(affirming the decision of the JCC finding Aetna responsible for the claimant's treatment, but
determining that the reason for the liability was Aetna's provision of insurance during the
time in which claimant suffered her last repeated action which led to the need for remedial
treatment); Schafrath v. Marco Bay Resort, Ltd., 608 So. 2d 97 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(JCC was reversed and the cause remanded where the claimant suffered an injury to her
elbow as the result of being hit by a swinging door and the JCC applied an incorrect burden
of proof to establish claimant's right to benefits).
232. Fritz, 592 So. 2d at 1168.
233. Id. at 1171.
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conflict with that of other doctors who testified that claimant's work
activities were the source of the injury, the JCC's decision was not
upheld.234
The determination of a JCC that a claimant's injury was not causally
related to employment was upheld by the court in Molnar v. Bob Evans
Restaurants.235 The claimant presented evidence of a slip and partial fall
while working as a waitress.236 Claimant experienced back pain and
numbness in the legs, and was admitted to the hospital. 37 Conflicting
testimony was presented as to whether the claimant's injuries resulted from
the slip and fall or from an infection, transverse myelitis.23 The court af-
firmed that the JCC had competent substantial evidence to support the
finding that the infection was a logical cause of the claimant's injury and
that the injury was not causally related to employment.239
A determination of causal relationship was rejected by the court where
the JCC based the determination on the doctor's statement that the claimant
said the injury occurred at work and the claimant suffered from a neck
injury.2 4' The court pointed out that it is up to the claimant to prove the
causal relationship between the employment and the injury.24' Here, the
court determined that the testifying doctor did not present evidence of a
relationship and that the finding below should be reversed.242
In Body Works, Inc. v. Chavez,243 the court accepted the finding of
causality in relation to medical treatment and attendant care for a cardiac
problem, but rejected the finding of causality in relation to a hearing
loss.244 The rejection of a causal relationship between the work and the
hearing loss was premised on the testimony of a doctor responding to a
hypothetical question regarding causal relationship. 45 Timely objection
was made to the hypothetical and to the response. Since, however, no other
234. Id. at 1170.
235. 592 So. 2d 742 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 742-43.
238. Id. at 743-44.
239. Id. at 744.
240. Olympic Assocs. v. Kimmel, 590 So. 2d 1088, 1089 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. 606 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
244. Id. at 1274.
245. Id.
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evidence relating to the hearing loss was presented, the court reversed the
order as to the compensability of the hearing loss.246
The court noted in Fincannon v. Eastern Airlines,47 that "[a]
claimant seeking workers compensation benefits is not required to show her
compensable injury was the sole cause of her disability." '248 In Fincannon,
the claimant was an airline reservationist who developed hoarseness,
laryngitis and trouble talking, which was diagnosed to be the result of
polyps on the vocal chords. The claimant was fifty-nine years of age, a
heavy smoker, and subject to severe allergies.249 The court commented:
There is no real dispute that immediately after claimant's surgery, she
ceased smoking until January 8, 1987. When claimant's surgery and
voice therapy and cessation of smoking failed to prevent the return of
nodules on her voice chords, it was recommended that she not return to
employment that required much voice usage. She had previously
attempted to return to Eastern but that resulted in voice failure. She
subsequently attempted retraining and reentry into the labor market but
her efforts, to date, have failed. This evidence restricting claimant's
employment to jobs which require very little voice usage supports a
finding of permanent impairment.2"'
Thus, the court is willing to find permanent disability, causally related to
employment, even where there are intervening factors that may impact on
the claimant's disability. It is the initial causal relationship that provides the
claimant with the right to compensation.
Where the parties have stipulated that an injury is causally related to
the work and is, therefore, compensable, the JCC must make specific
findings as to the continued viability of the stipulation prior to overturning
the stipulation.25' During a hearing the JCC determined that the claimant
had committed fraud and misrepresentation by working and earning money
while he was allegedly unable to work.252 The court noted that a JCC is
not required to follow a stipulation that is refuted by competent substantial
246. Id.
247. 611 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
248. Id. at 30.
249. Id. at 29.
250. Id. at 30-31 (citing Dayron Corp. v. Morehead, 509 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 1987);
Jackson v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 520 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
251. Jacobs v. Volker Stevin Constr., 609 So. 2d 132, 133 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
252. Id.
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evidence. However, the JCC must give notice to the parties that the JCC is
considering rejecting the stipulation. The failure to give due notice requires
that the case be remanded for further findings in regard to entitlement for
benefits.253
Where a claimant's hepatitis was found not to be causally related to the
industrial accident, a subsequent medical opinion to establish causation was
found not to be reasonably required.254 The claimant was originally in-
jured when he fell from a scaffold in the course and scope of employment.
The claimant developed hepatitis following surgery for the original injury.
Competent substantial evidence supported the finding that claimant had a
prior history of hepatitis and of alcohol consumption. The claimant's doctor
stated that there was a low probability of a causal connection between the
hepatitis and the industrial accident. That portion of the claimant's injury
which related to the industrial accident was compensable, while that part of
claimant's condition that was not causally related was not subject to cover-
age under the policy.255
8. Compensability/Benefits
The JCC examines each claim presented to determine whether a
compensable injury has occurred, and if so, what benefits should be paid.
The determination of the JCC must be based on an analysis of the law and
supported by competent substantial evidence.
In Whiskey Creek Country Club v. Rizer,25 6 the JCC found, and the
court upheld, an award of benefits for an employee's illness and subsequent
death by determining that there was competent substantial evidence from the
testifying doctors. 7 At the same, time the court reversed the award for
penalties and interest on the funeral expenses awarded by the JCC.258 The
court based its determination on section 440.20 of the Florida Statutes,
which provides penalties and interest for the late payment of compensa-
tion."' The court reasoned that funeral and medical expenses are not
compensation, and therefore, are not subject to penalties and interest. 26°
253. Id.
254. White v. Seminole Plastering, 609 So. 2d 761, 762 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
255. Id.
256. 599 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
257. Id. at 735.
258. Id.
259. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.20(7), (9) (1991)).
260. Id.
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A claimant's appeal from an order denying temporary disability wage
loss benefits, alternative medical care, penalties, and interest arising out of
a knee injury that aggravated a preexisting arthritic condition was reversed
on all three points raised on appeal.26' The claimant first contended that
the JCC erred in establishing the date of maximum medical improvement.
All parties had stipulated to the date and the court found no basis upon
which to overturn the stipulation.262 The claimant also contended that the
record lacked competent substantial evidence to support the JCC's finding
that the claimant's medical symptoms were solely the result of the preexist-
ing medical condition. The court agreed with this contention based upon the
deposition of claimant's doctor indicating that, taken as a whole, a twisting
accident constituted an aggravating cause of claimant's condition.263 The
claimant's third contention was that the order denying temporary wage-loss
and partial disability benefits based upon a failure to conduct a good faith
work search was in error. The court found that the employer/carrier failed
to notify the claimant of the need to make a good faith work search.264
The claimant's request that the court find internal cardiovascular
conditions compensable absent a finding of preexisting condition was denied
based on earlier case law decisions.265 Although there are instances in
which heart attacks are compensable,266 the claimant was requesting that
a new standard be established.26 The court found no legal support that
would permit it to make the changes suggested by claimant. 6 '
An award of temporary partial disability benefits for a three year period
was reversed by the court where the claimant appeared to have exaggerated
the extent of disability following an incident in which claimant's employ-
ment was terminated.269 The claimant was terminated from his position
for refusal to clean-up frozen turkeys, which fell after being stacked too
high.27" There was a difference of opinion as to whether the claimant had
261. Michael v. National Indus., Inc., 599 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
262. Id. at 243-44.
263. Id. at 244.
264. Id.
265. Zundell v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 609 So. 2d 1367, 1369 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1992), review granted, _ So. 2d _ (Fla. 1993).
266. See, e.g., Popiel v. Broward County Sch. Bd., 432 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied, 438 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1983).
267. Zundell, 609 So. 2d at 1368.
268. Id.
269. Publix Supermarket, Inc. v. Hart, 609 So. 2d 1342, 1346 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
270. Id. at 1344.
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been terminated because of his back problem or because of insubordination.
Therefore, the case was remanded to the JCC for further findings on the
question of whether claimant voluntarily limited his income. Should the
JCC find that the claimant was terminated for insubordination, the claimant
will have failed to satisfy his burden of showing that his change in
employment status was the result of a compensable injury.27 '
Where an order of the JCC ignored or overlooked evidence that the
claimant voluntarily limited his income, the court reversed an award for
wage-loss benefits and remanded the case for further findings.272 The
claimant rejected the city's offer of sedentary employment following an
injury within the course and scope of employment.27 3 On remand, the
JCC will have the option of accepting further evidence in order to make a
determination on wage loss benefits. 74
The court found that a JCC erred in finding a hernia repair noncompen-
sable where the claimant had a preexisting hernia.275 The claimant was
diagnosed as having an inguinal hernia in 1987 and declined surgery. The
hernia did not interfere with claimant's ability to perform his job. In 1989,
the claimant was involved in an altercation with one of his employers, and
was taken to the hospital with a fractured hip and an inguinal hernia.2 76
The court determined that since the claimant was not "disabled" from
working until the time of his work-related accident, the aggravation to the
preexisting condition made that condition compensable.2 77
The court affirmed the principle that where a claimant suffers from an
idiopathic condition that is not aggravated by the work situation, no
compensation is due the employee.2 78  The claimant in Hillsborough
County School Board v. Williams,279 suffered from a preexisting L5-S 1
bulge, and claimed that bending to pick up a paper on the school bus floor
aggravated the back problem. The court upheld the decision of the JCC,
which found that the claimant suffered injury solely as the result of normal
271. Id. at 1345.
272. City of West Palm Beach v. Dahl, 610 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
273. Id. at 458.
274. See id.
275. Delgado v. Blanco & Sons Catering, 606 So. 2d 658, 661 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 661.
278. See Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. v. McCook, 355 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (Fla. 1977)
(establishing the principle that an idiopathic condition that is not aggravated by the work
situation does not "arise out of' the employment).
279. 601 So. 2d 624 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
[Vol. 1 8
36
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 11
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/11
1993]
movement. ::' ° Based upon this finding, the injury was not compensa-
ble.28
In Gilreath v. Charlotte County Board of County Commissioners,282
the court found that where an employee was injured while charging the
battery of his car, the injury arose out of the employment and was,
therefore, compensable.283 The employer/carrier presented no evidence
that the claimant had deviated from his duties. The court rejected the
employer/carrier's contention that section 440.091 of the Florida Statutes
requires affirmance that the claimant was acting within the course of
employment. 284 The statutory section referenced by the court establishes
that an employee of a municipality, state, or political subdivision is deemed
an employee acting within the course of employment so long as the
employee "was not engaged in service for which he was paid by a private
employer, and he and his public employer had no agreement providing
workers compensation coverage for that private employment." '285 Addi-
tionally, the court noted that a claimant's status as a law enforcement officer
does not diminish the claimant's rights under the workers compensation
law.
286
In City of Holmes Beach v. Grace,28 7 the Florida Supreme Court
addressed the following question as one of great public importance:
WHETHER SECTION 440.02(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985),
DEFINING "ACCIDENT"' EXCLUDES A MENTAL OR NERVOUS
INJURY WHERE THE INJURY SUFFERED BY THE CLAIMANT
RESULTS IN ONLY MINOR PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES?2 8
The court chose to reword the question to:
WHETHER SECTION 440.02(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985),
DEFINING "ACCIDENT," EXCLUDES A MENTAL OR NERVOUS
INJURY WHERE THE PHYSICAL INJURY SUFFERED BY THE
280. Id. at 625.
281. Id.
282. 610 So. 2d 88 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
283. Id. at 89.
284. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.091 (1991)).
285. FLA. STAT. § 440.091(3) (1991).
286. Gilreath, 610 So. 2d at 89.
287. 598 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1992).
288. Id. at 72.
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CLAIMANT WAS NOT A CAUSE OF THE MENTAL OF NER-
VOUS INJURY?28 9
The supreme court answered the latter question in the affirmative and
quashed the decision of the court below, which had found that where a
policeman was struck by the elbow of a suspect, the subsequent psychiatric
illness of the policeman was compensable.2 9 The need to create a direct
link between a physical injury and a psychiatric illness limits the scope of
mental illness and stress claims to those based upon a physical injury. This
limitation serves to reduce the number and severity of stress and psychiatric
claims that are filed.
In Nationwide Insurance v. McGee, 9 the court determined that a
JCC erred in finding that the claimant suffered a compensable injury.29 2
The court noted that the record clearly established that all of claimant's
injuries were psychiatric.2 93 Section 440.02(1) of the Florida Statutes has
been construed as precluding compensation for mental or emotional injury,
unless the claimant establishes that such mental or emotional injury was the
direct and immediate result of a physical injury.9
Where a claimant's case was dismissed with prejudice for failure to
attend an independent medical examination ("IME"), the court reversed the
finding of the JCC. 295 The court based its decision on the fact that the
IME was not ordered by the JCC and that dismissal with prejudice was too
harsh a sanction for failure to attend an IME not ordered by the JCC.2 96
Where a carrier limited a claimant's award of hydrotherapy to
membership in a health club, the court reversed the finding of the JCC. 297
The court found that the claimant was entitled to payment for ajacuzzi hot
tub and for the balance of the purchase price of claimant's first hot tub.298
The claimant's first hot tub had suffered a crack and was not usable, thus
289. Id. at 74.
290. Id.
291. 597 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
292. Id. at 358.
293. Id.
294. Id. (interpreting section 440.02(1) of the Florida Statutes, 1989, which provides,
"A mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright or excitement only ... shall be deemed not
to be an injury by accident arising out of the employment.").
295. McConnell v. Florida Furniture Ctr., 611 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
296. Id.
297. Kubber v. Max Davis Assocs., 603 So. 2d 137, 139 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
298. Id. at 138-39.
[Vol. 18
38
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 11
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/11
1993]
necessitating the need for the jacuzzi hot tub. The court noted that there
was competent substantial evidence that the claimant did not have a public
facility available to him, and the employer/carrier did not introduce any
evidence to the contrary.299
The scope of benefits available to an injured employee may range from
lifetime medical care, prosthetic devices, wage-loss benefits, attendant care,
homes, and vehicles to accommodate disabilities. Many of the benefits,
while necessary to ensure a quality of life for the injured work, are so costly
they serve to drive up the cost of workers compensation insurance."'
299. Id. at 138.
300. See Edenfield v. B&I Contractors, Inc., 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2105 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1993) (reversing a summary judgment which denied a claim for wrongful
termination based upon the filing of a workers compensation claim); Meek v. Layne-Western
Co., 18 Fla. L, Weekly D2041 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1993) (reversing where the
JCC utilized the incorrect formula for the calculation of wage loss); Robinson v. Shands
Teaching Hosp., 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2029 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1993) (affirming
an award of psychiatric treatment by a physician selected by the employer); Belcher v. Dade
County Sch. Bd., 623 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 1993) (reversing where claimant was
denied certain household items, the cost of a maid and bathtub rails); Jones v. Petland
Orlando S., 622 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing a determination that
Rogaine treatment was experimental); Fawaz v. Florida Polymers, 622 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App.) (reversing where the JCC erred in applying the misrepresentation defense and
claimant was denied temporary partial disability benefits); Tumberry Assocs., Inc. v. Pierre,
618 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing an award of psychiatric treatment
where no claim for such treatment was made); Turner v. Rinker Materials, 622 So. 2d 80
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing the denial of temporary partial disability and wage
loss benefits where the claimant was not made aware of reporting requirements); Deep South
Products v. Beach, 616 So. 2d 156 (Fla 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming an award of
temporary partial disability, wage-loss, attendant care benefits, costs and attorneys fees
following claimant's incarceration for DUI); Arizona Chemical Corp. v. Hanlon, 605 So. 2d
938 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (awarding the claimant biodetoxification treatment, both
past and future, travelling expenses to obtain treatment and an in-home hot tub); Town &
Country Farms v. Peck, 611 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming an award of
a hospital bed and acupuncture treatments); Rodriguez v. Prestress Decking Corp., 611 So.
2d 59 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming the denial of death benefits where the
claimant was over the statutory age at the time of her brother's death); Bristol Myers Co. v.
Clark, 599 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing an order denying attendant
care and making the award retroactive); Value Rent A Car v. Liccardo, 603 So. 2d 680 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming an order to include gratuities in the calculation of AWW
even though the employer had no policy in regard to the reporting of gratuities and the
employee failed to provide the employer with a contemporaneous written report ofgratuities);
Maranje v. Brinks of Florida, Inc., 610 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (awarding
the claimant a two bedroom home with an in-ground heated pool and, because he was denied
this home during a fifteen month appeal, he was entitled to monetary damages which would
make him whole for the period he was without the home); Southeast Environmental
B3aig
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Many of the reform measures proposed for the workers compensation
system relate to limitations on benefits. Labor activists object to reform
efforts which concentrate on the reduction of benefits and highlight those
instances where there is employee claim fraud and employer fraud in
relation to proper premium as the real cost drivers in workers compensa-
tion."'
9. Occupational Disease
Section 440.151 of the Florida Statutes provides for several alternative
theories in relation to occupational disease.30 2 If a disease is classified as
an occupational disease, rather than one fitting the prolonged exposure
theory, the carrier of record at the time of the last exposure is liable for all
benefits payable to the claimant. 3  If, on the other hand, prolonged
exposure theory is found to be the basis of the claim, carriers are entitled to
contribution from each carrier of record for the period of time the carrier
issued the policy.3"4 The claimant is entitled to the same benefits under
either theory of recovery, however, the source of the benefits may vary.
Contractors, Inc. v. Cayasso, 611 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing an order
on wage-loss indicating that the statutory 80/80 formula should have been applied regardless
of whether the claimant had such earnings); Carroll Steel Erectors v. Alderman, 599 So. 2d
181 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming an award of death benefits to parents in spite
of erroneous standard of proof with respect to the issue of dependency); Martin County Bd.
of County Comm'rs v. Jones, 595 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming an
award of psychiatric care and wage-loss benefits); Gilley Trucking Co. v. Morrell, 591 So.
2d 302 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming an award of the cost of a conventional home
to the claimant, a quadriplegic, in lieu of a pre-fabricated home for the disabled); University
of Florida v. Massie, 602 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1992) (reversing the district court award of
modified benefits where an employee had a preexisting condition which was aggravated and
for which benefits were awarded); Nickolls v. University of Florida, 606 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (claimant's physical condition appeared to no longer restrict the capacity
to work, however, the JCC's determination that the claimant was required to do a work
search was not supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore reversal was
required).
301. On November 10, 1993, the Florida Legislature passed Senate Bill 12C, which
reforms workers compensation by reducing certain benefits and providing premium reduction
credits for employers. In response to this legislation, "Labor unions, trial lawyers, and some
legislators say that some of the most seriously injured workers are big losers." Tim Nickens,
Scoring Workers'Comp, Miami Herald, Nov. 11, 1993, at IC, 3C.
302. See generally FLA. STAT. § 440.151 (1991).
303. Id. § 440.151(5); see also Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Crittenden, 596 So. 2d 112 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
304. Crittenden, 596 So. 2d at 113.
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The court addressed a repeated trauma claim in the case of a worker
who cut, chopped, stirred and lifted in the role of oriental chef.3"5 The
court determined that exposure and repeated trauma cases should be
governed by the same principles as "repeated accidents. 3 °6  It is the
combination of the repeated accidents that leads to a compensable inju-
ry.307 In Tokyo House, Inc., the court found that a repeated trauma oc-
curred during the two year period before the claim was filed and found that
the compensation to the employee was due from the carrier of record during
that time.30 8
There are times when the link between industrial accident and a
separate normally noncompensable disease interact to create the need for
greater benefits to the employee. In Urban v. Morris Drywall Spray,309
the court determined that the claimant's compensable injury was aggravated
by preexisting diabetes. The court's determination was based upon an
earlier decision, which established the principle that where a preexisting
condition is aggravated by a compensable accident, the exacerbation of the
preexisting condition is itself compensable. 3t0 The court also found that
it was necessary to treat claimant's diabetic condition in order to render
effective treatment of claimant's compensable injuries.3 '
In Martin County School Board v. McIntosh,3"2 the court examined
the medical testimony supplied to the JCC and determined that there was
competent substantial evidence to support a finding of disabling occupational
disease without the need for further medical tests. The court found that the
claimant suffered from an occupational disease within the meaning of
Florida law3 t 3 by exhibiting the symptoms of chromate sensitivity and
resulting allergic reactions caused by concrete during the course of his
employment. 3 4  The court determined that a claimant need not "present
evidence of a positive patch test to satisfy the requirements of section
305. Tokyo House, Inc. v. Hsin Chu, 597 So. 2d 348, 349 n.I (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1992); see also Festa v. Teleflex, Inc., 382 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.) (discussing
the exposure and repeated trauma theory), review denied, 388 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1980).
306. Hsin Chu, 597 So. 2d at 351.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 352.
309. 595 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
310. Id. at 61 (citing Castro v. Florida Juice Division, 400 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. (1981)).
311. Id.
312. 605 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1992).
313. See generally FLA. STAT. § 440.151 (1991) (concerning occupational diseases).
314. McIntosh, 605 So. 2d at 166.
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440.151 [of the Florida Statutes] so long as the medical evidence is
otherwise legally sufficient to establish causation . .. . '
In another case, a claim for occupational disease benefits by a claimant
who developed pneumonia was reversed by the court.316 The claimant
was employed to wash buses and claimed that he developed pneumonia
from washing buses in inclement weather. The employer/carrier took the
deposition of an expert witness to challenge the causal relationship." 7
The doctor, however, was paid more than the statutory rate3 8 and the
claimant moved to strike the doctor's testimony.3"9 The JCC and those
present at the hearing on the merits engaged in dialogue that called into
question the veracity of the doctor and that indicated a bias on the part of
the JCC against .the doctor's testimony.320 The court vacated the order of
the JCC and remanded the case for a new hearing on the merits.12  The
dissent noted that, even though the JCC's comments lacked judicial
decorum, there was no evidence of bias and the findings of the JCC could
be upheld because they were supported by competent substantial evi-
dence.322
10. Average Weekly Wage
Under the 1989 provisions relating to the determination of average
weekly wage ("AWW"), the JCC found, and the First District Court of
Appeal affirmed, that a claimant injured while working as a camp counselor
was not entitled to an average weekly wage calculation, which included
earnings from a newspaper delivery route.323 The court stated that the
315. ld. at 167.
316. Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Phillips, 613 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
317. Id.
318. The Florida Statutes limits the fee payable to a health care provider as compensa-
tion for a deposition to $200. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(1) (1991).
319. Phillips, 613 So. 2d at 57.
320. Id. at 57-58.
321. ld
322. ld
323. City of Port Saint Lucie v. Chambers, 606 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1992), review denied, 618 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1993). The 1991 Amendments to chapter 440
eliminate the concurrent earnings provisions and limit the claimant to recovery from the
employment ongoing at the time of injury. FLA. STAT. ch 440 (1991). The constitutionality
of this provision is currently on appeal before the First District Court of Appeal. But see
Ciancio v. North Dunedin Baptist Church, 616 So. 2d 61 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(claimant failed to meet the heavy burden of establishing that the provision is unconstitutional
and the denial of benefits for concurrent wages is affirmed).
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wages from concurrent earnings are generally included (prior to the 1991
amendments) in the calculation of average weekly wage, but that the wages
of independent contractors were specifically excluded because such
contractors are not included in the definition of employee under section
440.02(12)(d)(1 ), Florida Statutes.324
Florida statute provides that where a claimant voluntarily limits
earnings, a JCC may apply a deemed earnings provision to the calculation
of average weekly wage.325 In Avellino v. Pantry Pride Enterprises,
Inc.,326 the court overturned a JCC's determination that the employer
should be allowed an offset because the claimant voluntarily limited
earnings. The court noted that the application of section 440.15(3)(b)(2)
involves the shifting of burdens of proof.327 Once the compensability of
the injury is established, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to
demonstrate that the claimant voluntarily limited his or her earnings.328
In this case, the employer/carrier failed to meet its burden and to establish,
by competent substantial evidence, that the claimant voluntarily limited
earnings. Therefore, the findings of the JCC were reversed and the cause
remanded for further proceedings.329
In PLM Florida Hotels, Inc. v. DeMarseul,330 the court reversed a
modification of the AWW award to a claimant who sustained a slip and fall
accident in the course and scope of employment. The claimant was awarded
a modification in AWW and the court found this error on the part of the
JCC.33" ' A modification is granted where the claimant makes a showing
of mistake of fact or where material evidence becomes available after the
order.332 The court determined that no new evidence was presented and,
therefore, the claimant was not entitled to a modification of AWW.333
Average weekly wage awards are determined by statutory dictate.334
In Stanley Steemer International v. Prescott,335 the court found that the
324. Chambers, 606 So. 2d at 451 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)(2) (1991)).
325. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)(2) (1991).
326. 597 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
327. Id. at 348 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)(2) (1991)).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. 611 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 620 So. 2d 760 (Fla.
1993).
331. Id. at 1362.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1362-63.
334. See FLA. STAT. § 440.15 (1991).
335. 615 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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JCC erred in selecting the section of the statute applicable to the determina-
tion of AWW. The claimant was employed as a "piece worker" delivering
subpoenas. The JCC determined that the statute would "punish" the
claimant "for demonstrating perseverance, motivation, and initiative." '336
The court withheld comment on whether there was a punishing effect in the
statute, but noted that the claimant's salary was most analogous to a
commission and this was the basis upon which the AWW calculation should
be made.337
11. Special Disability Trust Fund
Special disability trust funds are designed to assist in the hiring of
workers who are disabled whether or not the disablement occurred as the
result of an industrial accident.338 In Florida, a second injury or disease
that merges with previous permanent physical impairment and results in
substantially greater disability than from the second injury alone entitles the
employer to reimbursement for sixty percent of impairment benefits, sixty
percent of wage loss benefits during the first five years after maximum
medical improvement and seventy-five percent thereafter.339
In Special Disability Trust Fund v. Stephens, Lynn, Chernay &
Klein,34 the court upheld an order awarding the employers, in a consoli-
dated case, reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund for
supplemental permanent total disability benefits paid pursuant to section
336. Id.
337. Id. Other cases discussing AWW include: Efficient Sys., Inc. v. Florida Dep't of
Labor & Employment Sec., 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2035 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1993)
(remanding for recalculation of AWW where the JCC calculated the AWW based on prior
employment); Waldorf v. Jefferson County Sch. Bd., 622 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1 st Dist Ct. App.
1993) (affirming the selection of methodology for calculating AWW where the ]CC
determined the claimant's AWW should be based solely on the number of weeks he actually
worked during the term of his contract); Pishotta v. Pishotta Tile & Marble, Inc., 613 So. 2d
1373 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (claimant was an active partner in the business enterprise
and sought an AWW award based upon the duties performed); Brownell v. Hillsborough
County, 617 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming the JCC's award of AWW
minus the cost of uniforms supplied to the claimant); and Cardinal Indus. v. Pauley, 610 So.
2d 93 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (remanding for explanation from the JCC of factors used
to calculate the AWW).
338. UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS COMPENSATION
LAWS 41 (1993).
339. Id. The Second Injury Fund is based on a pro rata annual assessment of net
premiums of insurers and self-insurers. The assessments must equal the sum of the
immediate past three years' disbursements. Id.
340. 595 So. 2d 206 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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440.15(1)(e)(1) of the Florida Statutes.14' The court reviewed the legisla-
tive history of the statute to reach its conclusion, but noted that the
Legislature may not have accomplished its objective in the 1984 amendment
process.3 42 The court, therefore, certified the following question as one
of great public importance:
IS THE SPECIAL DISABILITY TRUST FUND, PURSUANT TO
SECTION 440.49(2)(C), FLORIDA STATUTES, REQUIRED TO
REIMBURSE EMPLOYERS FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PERMANENT
TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS PAID PURSUANT TO SECTION
440.15(1)(E)(1), FLORIDA STATUTES? 343
In Hillsborough County School Board v. Special Disability Trust
Fund,344 the court reversed a finding of the JCC denying reimbursement
from the Special Disability Trust Fund, thereby affirming its decision in
Avellino, and again certified the same question as one of great public
importance.345
The court also reversed the finding of the JCC in regard to reimburse-
ment from the special disability fund in Breakers Hotel v. Special Disability
Trust Fund.346 The court found that there was no collusion between the
employee and the carrier as to the settlement for attorney's fees and that the
employer should be entitled to reimbursement for an appropriate percentage
of the total settlement amount.347
In Florida Employers Insurance Service Corp. v. Special Disability
Trust Fund,3 41 the Florida Employers Insurance Service Corporation
("FEISCO") sought a declaratory statement from the court as to its right to
reimbursement from the special disability trust fund. FEISCO was prepared
to separate its payment of benefits into two checks, one for attorneys fees
and one payable to the claimant. The court determined that FEISCO did not
341. Id. at 209 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.15(i)(e)(!)
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. 596 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
345. Id.
346. 620 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
347. Id. at 1133. The Special Disability Trust Fund
and here the settlement did not separate the attorney's fc
claimant.
348. 615 So. 2d 859 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
(1991)).
does not reimburse attorney fees,
ees from the benefits paid to the
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jeopardize its right to reimbursement by issuing two checks in the manner
specified.349
12. Payment of Compensation Premiums
Among the basic principles of workers compensation law is the
payment of premiums by the employer for benefits to be paid to the
employee. In 1989, the Supreme Court of Florida consolidated and
addressed the common issue presented in the cases of Barragan v. City of
Miami and Giordano v. City of Miami,35° both involving a City of Miami
ordinance that permitted the city to collect contributions from employees for
the payment of workers compensation benefits.35' Since 1989, there have
been numerous cases that have tested the retroactivity of the supreme court's
decision in Barragan.352 The First District Court of Appeal has firmly
349. Id. at 861.
350. Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1989) (consolidating on review
and quashing the decisions below in the cases of City of Miami v. Barragan, 517 So. 2d 99
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1987) and Giordano v. City of Miami, 526 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1988)).
351. Id. at 254.
352. See City of Miami v. Bell, 606 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. (1992), review
granted, 621 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1993). In Bell, the First District affirmed the JCC's award of
additional benefits and certified the following question as one of great public importance:
IS SECTION 440.20(7) APPLICABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE, AND IF SO, CAN THE CITY OF MIAMI, BE LEGALLY
EXCUSED FROM PAYING A PENALTY PURSUANT TO THAT SECTION
ON THE AMOUNT OF PENSION OFFSET MONIES WITHHELD IN THE
PAST BECAUSE THE CITY DID SO IN GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE CITY ORDINANCE AUTHORIZING THE PENSION
OFFSET IN VIEW OF THE APPELLATE DECISIONS APPROVING ITS
VALIDITY?
Id. at 1189. The following cases certified the same question, and have been consolidated for
review to the Florida Supreme Court with Bell: City of Miami v. Arostegui, 606 So. 2d
1192 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1992) (award of additional benefits upheld); City of Miami v.
Hickey, 614 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding the award of additional
benefits); City of Miami v. McLean, 605 So. 2d 953 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992). In
addition to recertifying the question above, the court in McLean also certified the following
questions as one of great public importance:
Whether an increase in workers' compensation benefits, awarded pursuant to
section 440.21 to offset illegal deductions from an employee's pension fund, in
accordance with Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1989),
constitutes "compensation" for purposes of section 440.20, Florida Statutes?
Id. at 954; see also City of Miami v. Paredes, 614 So. 2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.)
(certifying the same question as certified in Bell, but not consolidated for review), review
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held to the position of retroactive application and has sought guidance from
the Supreme Court of Florida in regard to several questions certified as
being of great public importance. The position of the First District Court
of Appeal supports the long held premise that payments of workers
compensation premiums are the responsibility of the employer.
13. Attorney's Fees
In Leather Shop v. Mills, 353 the court reviewed an award of attor-
ney's fees made after an accident in 1986. 3" The pertinent Florida statute
provides: "A claimant shall be responsible for the payment of his own
attorney's fees, except that a claimant shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney's fee from a carrier or employer., 355  The two issues
presented were whether the JCC erred in awarding attorney's fees absent a
showing of bad faith and whether the JCC erred in awarding attorney's fees
based on temporary total disability.3 56 The court noted that it requires the
order of a JCC to specifically state whether an award of attorney's fees is
based on bad faith. 57 In the instant case, the order from the JCC was
silent on this matter. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the decision for
entry of the particular grounds upon which fees were awarded.3"8
granted, _ So. 2d (1993).
See also City of Miami v. Daugherty, 614 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
City of Miami v. Hammond, 614 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (award of
additional benefits upheld based upon a distinction between workers compensation benefits
for disability occurring in the course and scope of employment and pension disability benefits
which could accrue for any reason and did not need to be job related); City of North Bay
Village v. Cook, 617 So. 2d 753 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing and remanding for
inclusion in the offset determination of the amount of benefits paid to the claimant as
compensation on the authority of Barragan); Barber v. City of Daytona Beach, 614 So. 2d
669 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming an award of additional compensation to offset
illegal deductions of pension benefits when pension benefits have been reduced to the extent
of workers compensation payments); City of Miami v. Burnett, 596 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App.), review denied sub nom. City of Miami v. Ogle, 606 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1992)
(Barragan has retroactive application to July 1, 1973); City of Miami v. Beall, 610 So. 2d
631 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (claim for additional benefits denied based upon statute
of limitations); City of Miami v. Smith, 602 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(pension offset benefits were awarded for the period specified in the order).
353. 592 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
354. Id. at 745.
355. FLA. STAT. § 440.34(3) (1991).
356. Leather Shop, 592 So. 2d at 745.
357. Id. at 746.
358. Id
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In Sawyer v. Dover Cylinder Head Co.,"' the court reversed an
award of attorney's fees with instruction to calculate the attorney's fee on
the total stipulated amount of permanent total disability benefits and supple-
mental benefits obtained for claimant by virtue of his attorney's effort.36 °
The court noted that the attorney had expended time and effort on behalf of
the claimant in order to establish the right to permanent total disability
benefits and was, therefore, entitled to a fee based on these efforts.361
In Royal Services, Inc. v. Smith,362 the court reversed and remanded
an award of $25,000 in attorney's fees. The award was reversed due to the
failure of the JCC to establish the basis upon which the JCC departed from
the statutory fee formula.363 Although the JCC may depart from the
statutory fee formula, an analysis of the factors that led to the departure
must be included in the order.364
C. We Will Defend (Part One C)
We have the right and duty to defend at our expense any claim,
proceeding or suit against you for benefits payable by this insurance.
We have the right to investigate and settle these claims, proceedings or
suits. We have no duty to defend a claim, proceeding or suit that is not
covered by this insurance.36
Each workers compensation claim brought before the JCC is brought
in the name of the injured employee and the employer/carrier. The carrier
provides defense from the moment of notification of the claim and may
have established procedures for the employer to follow to ensure timely
reporting and payment. In the event that the employer/carrier does not
respond as required, a claimant may proceed with an additional claim for
bad faith.
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the following question
certified as being of great public importance:
WHEN AN EMPLOYEE CLAIMS INJURY ARISING FROM THE
ALLEGED FRAUDULENT ACT OF AN EMPLOYER/CARRIER
359. 593 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
360. Id. at 282.
361. Id. at 281.
362. 605 So. 2d 588 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
363. Id. at 589.
364. See id.
365. POLICY, supra note 12.
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COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF A PROCEEDING INITIATED
PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 440 [OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES] IS
A CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION OF GUILT PRESCRIBED IN
SECTION 440.37 A CONDITION TO THE MAINTENANCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT TORT ACTION? 36
6
The court answered the question in the negative and quashed the decision
of the district court.3 6 7 To reach this conclusion, the Supreme Court of
Florida noted that the Florida Workers Compensation Act was not meant to
bar recovery for intentional tortious conduct.36  Intentional tortious
conduct is also excluded from coverage under the Employers Liability
Insurance portion of the policy. As a matter of public policy, employers are
held liable for their own intentional acts and the WCELIP does not provide
coverage or a defense for such acts.
In Wackenhut Corp. v. Schisler,369 the court found that an admission
of bad faith in regard to payment of one claim did not constitute an
admission of bad faith in regard to subsequent claims. 370 To reach this
conclusion, the court examined the facts and decided that the employ-
er/carrier timely paid the claim for permanent disability benefits when
notified of the claim.37' The court cited to prior decisions in which it had
enunciated the principle that the nonpayment of claims immediately upon
the taking of the claimant's doctor's deposition was not grounds for a bad
faith award of attorney's fees. 72
Even when an award of attorney's fees for bad faith handling of a
claim is upheld, the court has determined that the fees awarded should
follow the statutory fee formula unless there are compelling reasons for
departure from this standard.373 The court specifically noted, however,
366. Sibley v. Adjustco, Inc., 596 So. 2d 1048, 1049 (Fla. 1992).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. 606 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (involving a wrap-up policy
between Wackenhut and Florida Power and Light). A wrap-up policy is used to provide
coverage for individuals who might otherwise "slip through the cracks" on large projects.
Generally, the wrap-up policy is the policy of last resort for a workers compensation
claimant. The policy is used when there is overlapping or no coverage for an individual who
has performed work for the parties but who may not be able to establish employee status.
370. Id. at 1253.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1252 (citing Doctor's Hosp. of Sarasota v. Taylor, 576 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
373. See Regal Woods Prods. v. Baschansci, 603 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
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that where warranted and supported by competent substantial evidence the
JCC would be justified in departing from the statutory fee formula.374
In Woolworth's Restaurant v. Cubillos, 375 the court reversed an award
of penalties.376 The court noted:
Penalties should not be imposed where the e/c [employer/carrier] timely
file a notice to controvert .... Although the record in the instant case
does not contain a notice to controvert, a portion of the JCC's order
states that "[t]his claim was totally controverted." Because no explana-
tion is offered, we must reverse the award of penalties and remand the
case for clarification of the JCC's order . . . . On remand, the JCC
should state explicitly whether the e/c sufficiently controverted the
claim, or, if the claim was not timely controverted, whether the e/c have
a valid excuse for not doing So1 7
7
The decision continues a chain of cases in which the court requires a
determination by the JCC that the employer/carrier has failed to meet its
obligations before an award of penalties or attorney's fees will be made for
bad faith.37
The court reversed an order denying bad faith attorney's fees where the
record showed that the employer/carrier had never sought to take the
deposition of the doctor whose testimony was essential to establishing the
claim.379 The claim for attorney's fees was made on the ground that the
employer/carrier acted in bad faith by not timely accepting the claimant as
permanently totally disabled." The employer/carrier testified that
permanent total disability benefits were awarded when claimant's doctor's
deposition was taken.3 1' The court's position was that the deposition was
scheduled by claimant's counsel, and that the employer/carrier had not
sought the information, which could have resolved the claim seventeen
months earlier. 32  Accordingly, the evidence used to deny bad faith
374. See id at 553.
375. 608 So. 2d 895 (Fla. Ist Dist Ct. App. 1992).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. See, e.g., Glades Gen. Hosp. v. Sullenger, 584 So. 2d 109 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1991); Four Quarters Habitat, Inc. v. Miller, 405 So. 2d 475 (Fla. ist Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Central Maintenance & Welding v. Simmons; 621 So. 2d 514 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
379. Kirkland v. Northwest Fla. Regional Hous. Auth., 596 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
380. Id. at 1260.
381. Id.
382. Id.
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attorney's fees was not competent to justify the delay in the carrier's
response.383
Where a carrier accepted an injury as compensable and began
compensation payments that were later reduced, the court reasoned that an
award of penalties, interest, and costs was required. 384  The carrier had
reduced payments in order to recoup what it believed were overpayments to
the claimant. In doing so, however, it recouped more than the amount it
believed the claimant owed. The claimant prevailed on many of her claims
in the proceedings below and the court remanded the case for the entry of
an award of penalties, interest, costs, and attorney's fees.3"5
D. We Will Also Pay (Part One D)
We will also pay these costs, in addition to other amounts payable as
insurance, as part of any claim, proceeding or suit we defend:
1. reasonable expenses incurred at our request, but not loss of
earnings;
2. premiums for bonds to release attachments and for appeal bonds in
bond amounts up to the amount payable under this insurance;
3. litigation costs taxed against you;
4. interest on a judgment as required by law until we offer the
amount due under this insurance; and
5. expenses we incur.386
This is a listing of various costs and expenses that the insurer is
obligated to pay in connection with the defense of any claim made against
the insured. These costs are in addition to any costs that the insurer is
required to pay pursuant to other sections of the policy.38
E. Other Insurance (Part One E)
We will not pay more than our share of benefits and costs covered by
this insurance and other insurance or self-insurance. Subject to any
limits of liability that may apply, all shares will be equal until the loss
383. Id. at 1261.
384. See McClure v. Goldman, Klasfeld, Horkey & Ferraro, 594 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
385. Id. at 354.
386. POLICY, supra note 12.
387. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 6.
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is paid. If any insurance or self-insurance is exhausted, the shares of all
remaining insurance will be equal until the loss is paid. 8
As noted previously, it is possible that more than one policy and/or
insurer may be liable for the benefits to claimant. This section of the policy
provides that only the portion of the claim that is tied to the policy under
which the claim is made will be paid by that policy. This section is
becoming more significant as a greater number of insureds retain a portion
of the responsibility (deductible plans) or self-insure for part or all of their
liability.389 The National Council on Compensation Insurance has filed a
Benefits Deductible Endorsement-WC 00 06 03,390 which has been ap-
proved for use in Florida. Individual carriers may also file large deductible
plans with state regulators.
F. Payments You Must Make (Part One F)
You are responsible for any payments in excess of the benefits regularly
provided by the workers compensation law including those required be-
cause:
I. of your serious and willful misconduct;
2. you knowingly employ an employee in violation of law;
3. you fail to comply with a health or safety regulation; or
4. you discharge, coerce or otherwise discriminate against any
employee in violation of the workers compensation law.
If we make any payments in excess of the benefits regularly provided
by the workers compensation law on your behalf, you will reimburse us
promptly."'
This section gives notice to the insured of the payments that .are not
insured or insurable under the policy contract.392 In some states, not
including Florida, benefit payments may be doubled if the employer know-
ingly hires a minor child.393 In such an instance, the carrier would make
the payment on behalf of the employer but would retain the right to reclaim
the excess payment from the employer.394
388. POLICY, supra note 12.
389. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 7.
390. POLICY, supra note 12.
391. Id.
392. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 7.
393. Id. at 8.
394. Id.
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G. Recovery From Others (Part One G)
We have your rights, and the rights of persons entitled to the benefits
of this insurance, to recover our payments from anyone liable for the
injury. You will do everything necessary to protect those rights for us
and to help us enforce them.395
This provision of the policy provides for subrogation against another
person or policy which may be responsible for all or part of the claim. An
employer may elect to waive the right of subrogation by requesting that the
carrier attach the Waiver of Our Right to Recover From Others Endorse-
ment--WC 00 03 13396 to the policy. This endorsement was filed as an
advisory endorsement, which means that each carrier using the endorsement
must file it with the state regulator and gain approval in accordance with the
laws of the state. The endorsement has limited use in the assigned risk
market, since it will only be reinsurable if attached to a policy for which
waiver of subrogation is required by contract. 97
In Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Fallen,9 ' a case of first
impression, the Fifth District Court of Appeal considered section 440.39(3)-
(a) of the Florida Statutes to determine whether an award of post-judgment
interest was proper on a judgment against a third-party tortfeasor. 99 The
case arose following the payment of workers compensation benefits to two
employees who had successfully pursued claims against third parties. The
insurer, however, held subrogation liens on the judgment."° The issue
before the court was whether Florida statute required that post-judgment
interest be paid on the pro rata share to the insurance company.40 1 The
court found that the statute does not directly address the issue of post-
judgment interest, but stated that both logic and equity dictate that the
395. POLICY, supra note 12.
396. NCCI, POLICY FORMS MANUAL, 1984.
397. FLORIDA WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE PLAN (1984) ("FWCIP"). The
FWCIP contains the rules which govern workers compensation assigned risk policies in
Florida. The Plan is filed with the state regulator and is applied to all employers who are
unable to obtain voluntary insurance or who do not qualify for self insurance. On November
10, 1993, the Florida Legislature passed Senate Bill 12C, which abolishes the FWICP and
its reinsuring mechanism. The bill will become effective December 31, 1993 provided that
it is signed by the governor. The Florida Join Underwriting Association ("JUA") will come
into effect on January 1, 1994, and will assume the insurance and reinsurance responsibilities.
398. 603 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
399. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.39(3)(a) (1991)).
400. Id.
401. Id. at 612.
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insurer is entitled to its pro rata share of the post-judgment interest collected
from the tortfeasors. °2
In Tarmac of Florida v. Gwaltney, °3 the Fifth District Court of
Appeal considered whether a trial court has the discretion to limit a carrier's
lien on future benefits to indemnity benefits, to the exclusion of medical
benefits. 4 4  The appellate court noted the literal wording of section
440.39(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes, which expressly states that the term
"benefits" includes both compensation and medical benefits and provides
that the carrier's pro rata recovery applies against each. 4 5  The court
concluded that the pro rata recovery applies to future, as well as past,
benefits. While the court reversed the decision of the trial court in this
matter, it acknowledged a conflict with an opinion the Second District Court
of Appeal issued on the same matter.4 6
H. Statutory Provisions (Part One H)
These statements apply where they are required by law:
I. As between an injured worker and us, we have notice of the injury
when you have notice.
2. Your default or the bankruptcy or insolvency of you or your estate
will not relieve us of our duties under this insurance after an injury
occurs.
3. We are directly and primarily liable to any person entitled to the
benefits payable by this insurance. Those persons may enforce our
duties; so may an agency authorized by law. Enforcement may be
against us or against you and us.
4. Jurisdiction over you is jurisdiction over us for the purposes of the
workers compensation law. We are bound by decisions against
you under that law, subject to the provisions of this policy that are
not in conflict with that law.
5. This insurance conforms to the parts of the workers compensation
law that apply to:
a. benefits payable by this insurance;
b. special taxes, payments into security or other special funds,
and assessments payable by us under that law.
6. Terms of this insurance that conflict with the workers compensa-
tion law are changed by this statement to conform to that law.
402. Id.
403. 604 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
404. Id.
405. Id. at 908 (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 440.39(3)(a) (1991)).
406. Id. (citing Payless Oil v. Reynolds, 565 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct, App. 1990)).
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Nothing in these paragraphs relieves you of your duties under this
policy.4"7
This section of the policy lists provisions which may be required by
one or more workers compensation laws. This provision allows the policy
contract to be adapted to the law of the state in which the insurance is
issued.
IV. PART Two-EMPLOYERS LIABILITY INSURANCE
A. How This Insurance Applies (Part Two A)
This employers liability insurance applies to bodily injury by accident
or bodily injury by disease. Bodily injury includes resulting death.
I. The bodily injury must arise out of and in the course and scope of
the injured employee's employment by you.
2. The employment must be necessary or incidental to your work in
a state or territory listed in Item 3.A. of the Information Page.
3. Bodily injury by accident must occur during the policy period.
4. Bodily injury by disease must be caused or aggravated by the
conditions of your employment. The employee's last day of last
exposure to the conditions causing or aggravating such bodily
injury by disease must occur during the policy period.
5. If you are sued, the original suit and any related legal actions for
damages for bodily injury by accident or by disease must be
brought in the United States of America, its territories or posses-
sions, or Canada. °8
The employers liability section of the WCELIP is applicable to
common law or other damages payable by the insured.4"9 This provision
differs from Part A which involves the statutory coverage mandated by a
state's workers compensation law. In Florida, the jurisdiction for claims
made under Part Two of the policy lies in the circuit court. Claims under
this section of the policy arise from common law torts that fall outside the
scope of the workers compensation laws. At the same time, the coverage
407. POLICY, supra note 12.
408. Id.
409. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 9.
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provided relates to bodily injury by accident or bodily injury by disease that
arises out of, and in the course and scope of, employment.41°
B. We Will Pay (Part Two B)
We will pay all sums you legally must pay as damages because of
bodily injury to your employees, provided the bodily injury is covered
by this Employers Liability insurance.
The damages we will pay, where recovery is permitted by law, include
damages:
1. for which you are liable to a third party by reason of a claim or
suit against you by that third party to recover the damages claimed
against such third party as a result of injury to your employee;
2. for care and loss of services; and
3. for consequential bodily injury to a spouse, child, parent, brother
or sister of the injured employee; and
provided that these damages are the direct consequence of bodily injury
that arises out of and in the course of the injured employee's employ-
ment by you; and
4. because of bodily injury to your employee that arises out of and in
the course of employment, claimed against you in a capacity other
than as the employer.41'
This is the basic indemnity provision of the employers liability section
of the policy. This insurance generally provides for "damages" in contrast
to "benefits." Damages are "[a] pecuniary compensation or indemnity,
which may be recovered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss,
detriment, or injury, whether to his person, property, or rights, through the
unlawful act or omission or negligence of another." '412 While workers
compensation is a no-fault system, employer's liability insurance is payable
as the result of ajudgment or settlement for damages. The damages payable
fall into three general categories.
1. Third Party Over
A "third party over" suit involves an employer who must pay workers
compensation benefits and who impleads a third party whose negligence was
responsible for the injury to the worker. A third party over suit may occur
410. Id.
411. POLICY, supra note 12.
412. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (6th ed. 1990).
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on a large construction project where the employee of one contractor is
injured due to the negligence of another contractor. The first contractor is
responsible for workers compensation payments to the injured worker, but
may implead the second contractor for contribution or indemnification. 13
2. Familial Suits
Some states permit a cause of action for close relatives of the injured
worker. Such actions would be outside the jurisdiction of the JCC and
would fall within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Familial suits may be
brought on the basis of loss of consortium414 or where a family member
has been injured in the course of caring for an injured employee. While
attendant care by a family member caring for a disabled worker is covered
by Florida's Workers Compensation Law, 15 and is covered, therefore,
under Part One of the policy, an injury to the family member while caring
for the injured worker would fall under Part Two of the policy.
413. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 10. See, e.g., Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Leisure Resorts,
Inc., 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2022 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 1993); Barbosa v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 617 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
414. FelTiter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980) (forming
the basis for inclusion of this coverage within the WCELIP).
415. See, e.g., Attitudes & Trends v. Arsuaga, 616 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App.
1993) (affirming an award of attendant care rendered prior to a physician's prescription for
such care); Frederick Electronics v. Pettijohn; 619 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Ist. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(partially affirming and reversing an award of attendant care by limiting the hours required
to meet the claimant's needs); Southern Indus. v. Chumney, 613 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (affirming an award of maid service where claimant suffered respiratory problems
and required a dust free environment); Timothy Bowser Constr. Co. v. Kowalski, 605 So. 2d
885 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming an award of attendant care by claimant's
parents); Buena Vida Townhouse Ass'n v. Parciak, 603 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (affirming the award of attendant care by family member, and examining the
appropriate rate of pay); Bojangles v. Kuring, 598 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(reversing and remanding an award of attendant care to claimant's husband where award was
a "blanket award"); Standard Blasting & Coating v. Hayman, 597 So. 2d 392 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (reversing an order denying a motion to reduce attendant care benefits to
injured employee's wife based upon the "nonprofessional status" of the wife); Gator Tire v.
Casteel, 595 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming an award of attendant care
and noting that failure of the employer/carrier to raise the applicability of statutory changes
in regard to attendant care in the court below precluded the issue from being raised on
appeal); Merritt Sea Wall v. Revels, 594 So. 2d 855 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming
an award of attendant care by claimant's wife, but reversing the payment for attendant care
at prevailing wage and establishing that the wage should be federal minimum wage).
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3. Dual Capacity Doctrine
The dual capacity doctrine allows recovery, in some states, where the
employer may have two roles in the injury to the employee.416 This
situation arises when the employer is also the manufacturer of equipment
that was involved in the injury to the employee. The employee may then
be entitled to workers compensation benefits and may be able to make a
claim against the employer as the manufacturer of a defective product.41'
True no-fault compensation laws, such as the Longshore and Harbor
Workers Compensation Act"'8 and the Black Lung Benefits Act,4" 9 are
not covered by Part Two of the policy because of their no-fault nature.
Coverage for compensation under the various federal acts is obtained by
endorsement to Part One of the policy. 2°
C. Exclusions (Part Two C)
This insurance does not cover:
1. liability assumed under a contract. This exclusion does not apply
to a warranty that your work will be done in a workmanlike
manner;
2. punitive or exemplary damages because of bodily injury to an
employee employed in violation of law;
3. bodily injury to an employee while employed in violation of law
with your actual knowledge or the actual knowledge of any of your
executive officers;
4. any obligation imposed by a workers compensation, occupational
disease, unemployment compensation, or disability benefits, or any
similar law;
5. bodily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by you;
6. bodily injury occurring outside the United States of America, its
territories or possessions, and Canada. This exclusion does not
apply to bodily injury to a citizen or resident of the United States
of America or Canada who is temporarily outside these countries;
7. damages arising out of coercion of any employee. 2
416. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 11.
417. See LARSON, supra note 1, § 72.00.
418. 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1988).
419. 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1988).
420. GUIDE, supra note 9, at II.
421. POLICY, supra note 12.
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This section of the policy lists the exclusions from coverage. It is
applicable only to Part Two of the policy since Part One coverage is
governed by statutory mandate. Exclusions are a common part of insurance
policies since the insurer is attempting to clarify what is and what is not
covered. The Fourth District Court of Appeal cited, with favor, to a
Minnesota appellate decision interpreting a policy exclusion, which stated:
"[u]nless ambiguous, the language used in an insurance contract must be
given its plain and ordinary meaning." '4 22 At the same time, it is an
established principle of law that an insurance contract will be liberally
construed in favor of the insured.42 3
D. We Will Defend (Part Two D)
We have the right and duty to defend, at our expense, any claim,
proceeding or suit against you for damages payable by this insurance.
We have the right to investigate and settle these claims, proceedings and
suits.
We have no duty to defend a claim, proceeding or suit that is not
covered by this insurance. We have no duty to defend or continue
defending after we have paid our applicable limit of liability under this
insurance."'
This provision is similar to the duty to defend provision discussed
under Part One. The main difference in the duty to defend under Part Two
is that employers liability insurance is subject to a policy limit (workers
compensation insurance is not so limited by statute) and, therefore, the duty
to defend under Part Two will exist to the point where the insurer has paid
the applicable limit of liability under the insurance.425
E. We Will Also Pay (Part Two E)
We will also pay these costs, in addition to other amounts payable under
this insurance, as part of any claim, proceeding, or suit we defend:
422. Great Global Assurance Co. v. Shoemaker, 599 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Alexandra House, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 419
N.W.2d 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)).
423. See LARSON, supra note I, § 93.00-93.10. Conflicts as to the meaning of policy
terms fall within the jurisdiction of the circuit court and require separate examination from
the issue of workers compensation law.
424. POLICY, supra note 12.
425. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 13.
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I. reasonable expenses incurred at our request, but not loss of
earnings;
2. premiums for bonds to release attachments and for appeal bonds in
bond amounts up to the limit of our liability under this insurance;
3. litigation costs taxed against you;
4. interest on a judgment as required by law until we off the amount
due under this insurance; and
4265. expenses we incur.
This is an explanatory section of the policy which outlines the costs
which will be borne by an insurer in defending an employer's liability
action. These costs and expenses are not necessarily part of the de-
fense.
4 27
F. Other Insurance (Part Two F)
We will pay no more than our share of damages and costs covered by
this insurance and other insurance or self-insurance. Subject to any
limits of liability that apply, all shares will be equal until the loss is
paid. If any insurance or self-insurance is exhausted, the shares of all
remaining insurance and self-insurance will be equal until the loss is
paid.428
This section mimics the rights of the insurer to pay only its fair share
of any claim that is found in Part One E of the policy. The difference in
language is indicative of the payment of damages under Part Two and
benefits under Part One.429
G. Limits of Liability (Part Two G)
Our liability to pay for damages is limited. Our limits of liability are
shown in Item 3.B. of the Information Page. They apply as explained
below.
I. Bodily Injury by Accident. The limit shown for "bodily injury by
accident-each accident" is the most we will pay for all the damages
covered by this insurance because of bodily injury to one or more
employees in any one accident.
426. POLICY, supra note 12.
427. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 13.
428. POLICY, supra note 12.
429. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 13.
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A disease is not bodily injury by accident unless it results directly
fi'om bodily injury by accident.
2. Bodily Injury by Disease. The limit shown for "bodily injury by
disease-policy limit" is the most we will pay for all damages
covered by this insurance and arising out of bodily injury by
disease, regardless of the number of employees who sustain bodily
injury by disease. The limit shown for "bodily injury by disease-
each employee" is the most we will pay for all damages because
of bodily injury by disease to any one employee.
Bodily injury by disease does not include disease that results
directly from a bodily injury by accident.
3. We will not pay any claims for damages after we have paid the
applicable limit of our liability under this insurance.430
Unlike workers compensation insurance, employer's liability insurance
is subject to limits of liability.4 3' The standard limits of liability are
$100,000 for bodily injury by accident, $100,000 for bodily injury by
disease, and an aggregate of $500,000 for the policy.4 32 It is possible for
employers to purchase additional coverage under this section of the policy
or obtain coverage by means of an excess or "umbrella policy. 4 33 Some
states, not including Florida, provide for unlimited employers liability under
the WCELIP.4 34
H. Recovery From Others (Part Two H)
We have your rights to recover our payment from anyone liable for an
injury covered by this insurance. You will do everything necessary to
protect those rights for us and to help us enforce them.43
This section of the policy is similar to the subrogation section of the
workers compensation portion of the policy (Part One C). It provides that
the insurer has the right to step into the shoes of the insured to recover from
a third party when possible.
430. POLICY, supra note 12.
431. GuIDE, supra note 9, at 13.
432. Id.
433. Id
434. Id. at 14.
435. POLICY, supra note 12.
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I. Action Against Us (Part Two I)
There will be no right of action against us under this insurance unless:
I. You have complied with all the terms of this policy; and
2. The amount you owe has been determined with our consent or by
actual trial and final judgment.
This insurance does not give anyone the right to add us as a defendant
in an action against you to determine your liability.436
This section is the opposite of the provision in Part One H.3., which
allows a party to join the insurer in any suit for workers compensation
benefits. Under this section of the policy, there is no right of direct action
until the insurer's liability has become fixed by judgment or settlement.4 37
V. PART THREE-OTHER STATES INSURANCE
A. How This Insurance Applies (Part Three A)
1. This other states insurance applies only if one or more states are
shown in Item 3.C. of the Information Page.
2. If you begin work in any one of those states and are not insured or
are not self-insured for such work, the policy will apply as though
that state were listed in Item 3.A. of the Information Page.
3. We will reimburse you for the benefits required by the workers
compensation law of that state if we are not permitted to pay the
benefits directly to persons entitled to them.438
B. Notice (Part Three B)
Tell us at once if you begin work in any state listed in Item 3.C. of the
Information Page.439
Part Three of the policy provides for extraterritorial coverage for
workers compensation benefits. The coverage may be extended to any state
in which the employer has no ongoing work at policy inception, but for
436. Id.
437. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 14.
438. POLICY, supra note 12.
439. Id.
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which temporary and incidental exposure may occur during the policy
term.44° Other states' insurance presents one of the most contentious
sections of the policy. High mobility of workers has created a situation in
which workers travel frequently and wish to elect the higher paying benefits
of the state of injury to those of the state of employment. Florida has dealt
with the issue of travelling employees through amendment to-the workers
compensation law.44' The Legislature has also left intact the extraterrito-
rial provisions of Florida's workers compensation law, which provides:
Where an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere
than in this state, which would entitle him or his dependents to
compensation if it had happened in this state, the employee or his
dependents shall be entitled to compensation if the contract of employ-
ment -was made in this state, or the employment was principally
localized in this state. However, if the employee shall receive compen-
sation or damages under the laws of any other state, nothing herein
contained shall be construed so as to permit a total compensation for the
same injury greater than provided herein.442
The First District Court of Appeal reviewed one case, deciding whether
a worker injured in another state could claim Florida workers compensation
benefits.443 The court determined that the worker was not within the
jurisdiction of the Florida workers compensation law by analyzing the
employment contract and determining that the union official who negotiated
the contract in Florida was without hiring authority.444 Since the contract
of hire was not entered into in Florida, Florida did not have jurisdiction over
the claim for benefits.4 5
VI. PART FOUR-YOUR DUTIES IF INJURY OCCURS
Tell us at once if injury occurs that may be covered by this policy.
Your other duties are listed here.
440. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 15-16.
441. See FLA. STAT. § 440.092(4) (1991).
442. Id. § 440.09(1).
443. Nelson v. McAbee Constr., Inc., 591 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
444. Id. at 1017.
445. Id. at 1018.
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I. Provide for immediate medical and other services required by the
workers compensation law.
2. Give us or our agent the names and addresses of the injured
persons and of witnesses, and other information we may need.
3. Promptly give us all notices, demands and legal papers related to
the injury, claim, proceeding or suit.
4. Cooperate with us and assist us, as we may request, in the
investigation, settlement or defense of any claim, proceeding or
suit.
5. Do nothing after an injury occurs that would interfere with our
right to recover from others.
6. Do not voluntarily make payments, assume obligations or incur
expenses, except at your own cost.
446
This section of the policy outlines the duties of the employer in the
case of injury. The primary obligation of the employer is to provide for
immediate medical and other services needed by the injured employee. The
employer is then required to give notice to the insurer of the injury and to
cooperate in the investigation, defense, and settlement of any claim,
proceeding, or suit.
VII. PART FIVE-PREMIUM
A. Our Manuals (Part Five A)
All premium for this policy will be determined by our manuals of rules,
rates, rating plans and classifications. We may change our manuals and
apply the changes to this policy as authorized by law or a governmental
agency regulating this insurance.447
Each insurance carrier.. or rate service organization449 is required
to file its manual of classifications, rates, every rating plan, and every
modification of these that it proposes to use. Members of a rate service
organization may fulfill their filing requirements through the filings of the
rate service organization.45  Once approved by the regulator, these
446. POLICY, supra note 12.
447. Id.
448. See FLA. STAT. § 627.091(1) (1991).
449. See id. § 627.091(4).
450. see id.
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manuals establish the method for determining the rates for each employer
within the state.45' In addition to the filing of rates for each of the
employment classification codes, employers are subject to having their rates
modified by their loss experience expressed as an experience modification
factor. '2
B. Classifications (Part Five B)
Item 4 of the Information Page shows the rate and premium basis for
certain business or work classifications. These classifications were
assigned based on an estimate of the exposures you would have during
the policy period. If your actual exposures are not properly described
by those classifications, we will assign proper classifications, rates and
premium basis by endorsement to this policy. 53
Classification codes are filed by the rate service organization or by the
insurer in order to establish fairness in the rating process. The classification
codes allow for similar employments to be placed within the same rating
structure. Each classification code carries a detailed description, allowing
the employer to review the codes assigned to his business. 54 The purpose
of classification is to reflect the actual exposure of the employer.
C. Remuneration (Part Five C)
Premium for each work classification is determined by multiplying a
rate times a premium basis. Remuneration is the most common premi-
um basis. This Premium basis includes payroll and all other remunera-
tion paid or payable during the policy period for the services of:
1. all your officers and employees engaged in work covered by this
policy; and
2. all other persons engaged in work that could make us liable under
Part One (Workers Compensation Insurance) of this policy. If you
do not have payroll records for these persons, the contract price for
their services and materials may be used as the premium basis.
451. See id. § 627.101.
452. See id. § 627.291. This section of the statute establishes an aggrieved person
remedy for any employer who seeks review of the rates or rating plans used to develop that
employer's rates. Among the factors that may be reviewed is the experience modification
factor, which is calculated based upon a filing by the rate service organization or the carrier.
453. POLICY, supra note 12.
454. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE, SCOPES MANUAL OF
WORKERS COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYERS LIABILITY INSURANCE (1984).
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This paragraph 2 will not apply if you give us proof that the
employers of these persons lawfully secured their workers compen-
sation obligations.455
Remuneration is determined by rules filed and approved by the
regulator.456 The purpose of determining remuneration is to establish the
amount of payroll, which forms the basis for the calculation of premi-
um 457
D. Premium Payments (Part Five D)
You will pay all premium when due. You will pay the premium even
if part or all of a workers compensation law is not valid.458
This provision of the policy establishes that all premiums are due and
payable by the insured. Historically, this provision remains from a time
when part or all of workers compensation laws were found to be unconstitu-
tional takings or a denial of access to the courts. 459 Today, reform of
workers compensation laws reopens the challenge to the constitutionality of
such laws. In both Florida and Texas, recent reform efforts have met with
determinations of unconstitutionality.
460
E. Final Premium (Part Five E)
The premium shown on the Information Page, schedules, and endorse-
ments is an estimate. The final premium will be determined after this
policy ends by using the actual, not the estimated, premium basis and
the proper classifications and rates that lawfully apply to the business
and work covered by this policy. If the final premium is more than you
paid to us, you must pay us the balance. If it is less, we will refund the
balance to you. The final premium will not be less than the highest
minimum premium for the classifications covered by this policy.
If this policy is canceled, final premium will be determined in the
following way unless our manuals provide otherwise.
455. POLICY, supra note 12.
456. See FLA. STAT. §627.091 (1991).
457. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE, BASIC MANUAL OF WORKERS
COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYER LIABILITY INSURANCE (1984) [hereafter BASIC MANUAL].
458. POLICY, supra note 12.
459. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 20.
460. Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1991); Texas Workers' Compensation
Comm'n v. Garcia, 862 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
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1. If we cancel, final premium will be calculated pro rata based on
the time this policy was in force. Final premium will not be less
than the pro rata share of the minimum premium.
2. If you cancel, final premium will be more than pro rata; it will be
based on the time this policy was in force, and increased by our
short-rate cancellation table and procedure. Final premium will not
be less than the minimum premium.46 '
The policy language establishes that the premiums for workers
compensation are an estimate. The actual premium will be determined on
audit following the policy term. This permits the calculation of premiums
to be based on the actual payroll of the employer.
F. Record (Part Five F)
You will keep records of information needed to compute premium.
You will provide us with copies of those records when we ask for
them. 4
62
By the terms of the policy contract, the insured has the obligation of
keeping records which will enable the carrier to establish a final premium.
The insured is also obligated to provide the insurer with copies of the
information upon request.
G. Audit (Part Five G)
You will let us examine and audit all your records that relate to this
policy. These records include ledgers, journals, registers, vouchers,
contracts, tax reports, payroll and disbursement records, and programs
for storing and retrieving data. We may conduct the audits during
regular business hours during the policy period and within three years
after the policy period ends. Information developed by audit will be
used to determine final premium. Insurance rate service organizations
have the same rights we have under this provision.463
This section of the policy establishes the insurer's right to audit the
employer's records for a period up to three years following the policy term.
461. POLICY, supra note 12.
462. Id.
463. Id.
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The right to audit is also extended to the rate service organization by this
provision.
VIII. PART SIX-CONDITIONS
A. Inspection (Part Six A)
We have the right, but are not obliged to inspect your workplaces
at any time. Our inspections are not safety inspections. They relate
only to the insurability of the workplaces and the premiums to be
charged. We may also recommend changes. While they may help
reduce losses, we do not undertake to perform the duty of any person
to provide for the health or safety of your employees or the public. We
do not warrant that your workplaces are safe or healthful or that they
comply with laws, regulations, codes or standards. Insurance rate
service organizations have the same rights we have under this provi-
sion.464
The insurer, by this provision, retains the right to inspect the employ-
er's premises. The inspection may be part of the audit process or may be
conducted for other reasons. Liability for a warranty of safety is specifically
disclaimed.465
B. Long Term Policy (Part Six B)
If the policy period is longer than one year and sixteen days, all
provisions of this policy will apply as though a new policy were issued
on each annual anniversary that this policy is in force.466
This provision relates to a rule in one of the filed and approved
manuals.467 This rule states that a policy may be issued for any period not
longer than three years. If the policy is issued for a period not longer than
one year and sixteen days, it is treated as a one year policy. For any term
464. Id.
465. See James v. State, 457 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1983); Viducich v. Greater New York
Mut. Ins. Co., 192 A.2d 596 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 195 A.2d 21 (N.J.
1963).
466. POLICY, supra note 12.
467. BASIC MANUAL, supra note 457, at Rule III.C.
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longer than this, the policy is divided into one year units and a unit less than
twelve months is treated as a short term policy.468
C. Transfer of your Rights and Duties (Part Six C)
Your rights or duties under this policy may not be transferred without
our written consent. If you die and we receive notice within thirty days
after your death, we will cover your legal representative as insured.469
This provision prevents the assignment of the policy without the
consent of the insurer. A minor exception is made in the event the insured
dies. In that instance, the policy may be held for thirty days by the executor
or administrator of the insured's estate provided the insurer is given notice
within thirty days of the death. Nonassignability is essential to ensure that
the liability and exposure under the policy is not changed.
D. Cancellation (Part Six D)
I. You may cancel this policy. You must mail or deliver advance
written notice to us stating when the cancellation is to take effect.
2. We may cancel this policy. We must mail or deliver to you not
less than ten days advance written notice stating when the cancella-
tion is to take effect. Mailing that notice to you at your mailing
address shown in Item 1 of the Information Page will be sufficient
to prove notice.
3. The policy period will end on the day and hour stated in the
cancellation notice.
4. Any of these provisions that conflict with a law that controls the
cancellation of the insurance in this policy is changed by this state-
ment to comply with the law.470
Cancellation of a workers compensation policy is subject to the policy
terms and to statutory requirements.47 ' In Curtis-Hale, Inc. v. Gelt,
472
the court examined whether cancellation of a policy had been accomplished
with due regard for the requirements of law. The original policy issued to
Geltz was through the assigned risk plan and was assigned by the plan
468. GUIDE, supra note 8, at 22.
469. POLICY, supra note 12.
470. Id.
471. See FLA. STAT. § 627.4133(l) (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. § 440.42(2) (1991).
472. 610 So. 2d 558 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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administrator to Aetna Casualty Company in August 1987.47' By Novem-
ber 1987, Aetna had notified the insured of its intent to cancel for non-
payment of premium. The policy was reinstated on receipt of payment, and
was canceled when later payments did not clear the bank. Aetna requested
assistance from the Division of Insurance as to how to proceed with
cancellation and was advised that thirty days notice was required. The
policy was canceled on May 14, 1988 and the claim for which Geltz sought
coverage occurred in September of 1988. Geltz sought coverage from
another carrier two days after the occurrence of the industrial accident. The
court construed these facts as competent substantial evidence that the policy
had been canceled in accordance with law, and that the employer had been
provided with the notice that was the intent behind the law.474 In the
event the policy had not been properly canceled, the insurer would have had
an obligation to provide coverage for the industrial accident.
E. Sole Representative (Part Six E)
The insured first named in Item I of the Information Page will act on
behalf of all insureds to change this policy, receive return premium, and
give or receive notice of cancellation.475
This provision is intended to allow the first named insured on the
information page to act on behalf of any other named insured. This
provision is necessary when there is more than one named insured since
only one legal entity at a time may carry out transactions with the carri-
er.
4 76
IX. CONCLUSION
The Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance
Policy-WC 00 00 00 is the basic insuring contract for workers compen-
sation and employers liability during the survey period. The revisions to the
policy are unlikely to impact any of the decisions rendered by the JCC's, the
First District Court of Appeal, or the Supreme Court of Florida in the
immediate future.
473. Id. at 559.
474. Id. at 562.
475. POLICY, supra note 12.
476. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 23.
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Of great significance to the adjudicatory decisions, however, are the
legislative amendments to the workers compensation laws. At this time,
many legislatures are reforming workers compensation systems. Nonethe-
less, the workers compensation and employers liability insurance policy is
a stable contract capable of accommodating the reform legislation and the
changing requirements of the workplace.
Workers compensation law is at a crossroads. The costs of maintaining
a no-fault insurance system for a highly mobile and diversified workforce
increases exponentially each year.477 Industrial accident costs for medical
and indemnity benefits have risen significantly and an already overburdened
system struggles to respond. Clearly, the introduction of reform legislation
has been directed at driving down the cost of workers compensation insur-
ance in order to ensure that a remedy that has provided benefits to injured
workers for over ninety years continues to do so into the next century.
477. UNrrED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS COMPENSATION
LAWS (1993).
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